Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and Unfair Labor Practices by Sprague, Robert
SPRAGUE_FINAL 
 
957 
FACEBOOK MEETS THE NLRB: 
EMPLOYEE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS AND 
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
 
Robert Sprague∗ 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the past eighteen months, the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”) has received approximately one hundred charges from 
employees that were disciplined or fired as a result of their work-related 
online communications, principally through Facebook.  These and other 
charges have resulted in twenty-one NLRB Office of the General Counsel 
Advice Memoranda, ten General Counsel reviews, four Administrative 
Law Judge (“ALJ”) decisions, and one Board decision, all addressing 
employee use of social media.  This Article is the first to examine in detail 
those employee charges and the thirty-six incidents addressed by the Office 
of the General Counsel, the ALJs, and the Board.  This Article’s analysis 
reveals that, based on these charges and incidents, most employees are not 
engaging online in concerted activities protected by the National Labor 
Relations Act.  Rather, for the most part, they are griping about work and 
getting fired for it.  However, these charges and incidents have raised 
concerns over the enforcement of overly broad social media policies by 
employers.  Most importantly, the nature of social media technologies 
raises new issues of unlawful employer surveillance that have yet to be 
directly addressed by the NLRB.  These three issues are examined through 
this article:  determining when employee online communications are 
protected concerted activity, determining what constitutes an acceptable 
social media policy, and determining when an employer might engage in 
unlawful online surveillance. 
 
∗ J.D., M.B.A. Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, University of Wyoming 
College of Business.  The author thanks Abigail Fournier, J.D. 2013, University of 
Wyoming College of Law, for her superb assistance in analyzing the NLRB documents 
referenced in this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the continued growth of social media platforms, it was inevitable 
that employees would voice their complaints about work online.  
Employers may be inclined to discipline or even fire employees due to 
online postings critical of the workplace.  If, however, those online 
postings constitute protected concerted activity, the National Labor 
Relations Act1 (“NLRA” or “Act”) may prevent employers from taking any 
disciplinary action.  Between June 2009 and April 2011, the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”) received approximately one hundred charges 
from employees that were disciplined or fired due to online postings, 
primarily on Facebook.  Since late 2010, the NLRB has addressed thirty-six 
situations involving employee online postings and employer social media 
policies.  This Article examines the analyses underlying thirty-two of those 
incidents, highlighting situations in which employee online postings can 
constitute concerted activity protected under federal law. 
To establish the foundation for the forthcoming analyses, this Article 
first provides an overview of what constitutes protected concerted activity 
under section 7 of the NLRA.  This Article then examines twenty-one 
NLRB Office of the General Counsel Memoranda, seven additional 
General Counsel reviews, four Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
decisions, and one Board decision.2  Application of these conclusions and 
decisions are then applied in the context of employees complaining about 
work online, primarily on Facebook.  Three issues are examined in detail:  
(1) exactly when an employee is engaged in protected concerted activity 
when complaining online about work; (2) what is expected of employers in 
fashioning social media policies so as to not unlawfully inhibit employee 
concerted activities; and, (3) what subtleties lurk in the Facebook age with 
regard to employer surveillance of employee online activities. 
 
I. SECTION 7 PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
Section 7 of the NLRA protects concerted activity:  It guarantees 
employees the right to “engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose 
of . . . mutual aid or protection.”3  Section 7 is enforced by section 8(a)(1) 
of the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
 
 1.  29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). 
 2.  Within this Article, activities by the NLRB generally, such as memoranda from the 
Office of the General Counsel, will be identified with “NLRB.”  Decisions by the NLRB’s 
(usually) five-member quasi-judicial body will be identified as being by the “Board.” 
 3.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
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“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 157 of this title [section 7 of the NLRA].”4 
The term “concerted activities” is not defined by the NLRA and has 
been the subject of challenging interpretations and debate.5  In one of the 
first interpretations of that term, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when 
seven employees had, after numerous complaints, walked off the job 
because their machine shop was too cold, they had engaged in protected 
concerted activity.6  The Court concluded the workers’ walkout served as a 
means for the “workers to act together to better their working conditions.”7  
The Court also noted that the workers’ section 7 rights were especially 
important in this case because they were “wholly unorganized;” “[t]hey had 
no bargaining representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind to 
present their grievances to their employer.  Under these circumstances, they 
had to speak for themselves as best they could.”8  This language has 
subsequently been used to confirm that section 7 rights apply to nonunion 
workplaces,9 particularly since those workers have no designated 
bargaining representative.10 
The NLRB, which enforces section 7,11 articulated its approach to 
concerted activity in an August 2011 Advice Memorandum from the Office 
 
 4.  Id. § 158(a)(1). 
 5.  See Calvin William Sharpe, “By Any Means Necessary”—Unprotected Conduct 
and Decisional Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 203, 204 (1999) (“The issue of how far unorganized and organized employees can 
go in pressing legitimate claims has been controversial since the inception of the . . . 
NLRA.”); see also Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:  
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 396 (2d ed. 2004) (“Whether employee 
activity falls within or without the shelter of section 7 is . . . a definitional issue of utmost 
importance in the administration of the Act.”). 
 6.  NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1962). 
 7.  Id. at 14. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: 
Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 278 (2002) (noting that 
section 7 rights are not limited to employees represented by a union) (citing In re Epilepsy 
Found. of Northeast Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. 
Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
536 U.S. 904 (2002)). 
 10.  See Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.3d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(citing Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14).  Charles Morris has argued that while section 
7 clearly applies in a nonunion setting, Congress intended it to apply to pre-organizational 
activity—i.e., activity precursory to formal union organization.  Charles J. Morris, NLRB 
Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 
Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1751 (1989).  Morris further argues that the NLRB and 
the courts should emphasize the strong nexus between traditional union activity and mutual-
aid-or-protection concerted activity to vindicate not only employment rights of individual 
employees, but particularly public rights expressed by the NLRA.  Id. at 1751–52. 
 11.  See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.43 (2011) (providing the procedures used in 
investigating and prosecuting unfair labor practices). 
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of the General Counsel:  “An individual’s activity is concerted when the 
individual acts ‘with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely 
by and on behalf of the employee himself.’”12  In addition, “individual 
activities that are the logical outgrowth of concerns expressed by the 
employees collectively are considered concerted.”13  The Board has also 
determined that “employee discussions related to shared concerns about 
terms and conditions of employment constitute concerted activity even if 
no specific group action is contemplated . . . .”14  In contrast, “comments 
made solely by and on behalf of the employee himself are not concerted.”15  
Finally, in order for the concerted activity to be protected, it must relate to 
working conditions.16  In sum, “Congress conceived protected concerted 
activity as a guarantee of the right of workers to organize and express 
themselves freely . . . concerning their wages and working conditions.”17 
II. SOCIAL MEDIA POSTINGS AS PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
While workers being fired or disciplined as a result of their online 
postings is not a new phenomenon,18 such incidents had rarely been 
 
 12.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Cornele A. 
Overstreet, Regional Director of Region 28, Sagepoint Financial, Inc., No. 28-CA-23441, 
2011 WL 3793672, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem.], available 
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45805fa7fd (citing Meyers Indus., 268 
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (Meyers I), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), on remand Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 
(1986) (Meyers II), aff’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988)); see also Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Docket No. 3-
CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at 7 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 09031d4580622877 (pagination based on 
NLRB-source document).  See infra note 29 (discussing Advice Memoranda).  
 13.  Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14.  Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., 350 N.L.R.B. 203, 212 (2007), enforced sub 
nom. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2008)).  
 15.  Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497).  
 16.  See, e.g., Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to 
Richard L. Ahearn, Regional Director of Region 19, The Wedge Corp. d/b/a/ The Rock 
Wood Fired Pizza & Spirits, No. 19-CA-32981, 2011 WL 4526829, at *3 (Sept. 19, 2011) 
[hereinafter Rock Wood Adv. Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document 
.aspx/09031d4580681027 (“[W]hen employees engage in conduct to address the job 
performance of their coworkers or supervisor that adversely impacts their working 
conditions, their activity is protected.”). 
 17.  Morris, supra note 10, at 1684.  See infra Part III.A. (analyzing further the issue of 
protected concerted activity). 
 18.  See, e.g., Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There Legal Protections for 
Employees Who Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355, 357–58 (2007) (describing examples 
of employees fired as a result of materials they had published online); Marc Cote, Note, 
Getting Dooced: Employee Blogs and Employer Blogging Policies Under the National 
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addressed by the NLRB.  In Fall 2007, an employee-union representative 
was fired after posting a story on a union website critical of the employer’s 
level of patient care.19  The Board determined the employee’s comments 
were directly related to the impact of staffing levels on nurses’ terms and 
conditions of employment.20  As such, the statements were a protected 
concerted activity.21 
For the next two years, it did not appear there was much concern with 
whether employee online postings constituted protected concerted 
activity,22 at least not until November 2009, when Dawnmarie Souza was 
called into her supervisor’s office.23  Souza, a paramedic employed by 
American Medical Response of Connecticut (“AMR”), was instructed by 
her supervisor to write an incident report concerning one of the calls she 
made on her shift, ostensibly because a complaint had been filed against 
her by the husband of a woman Souza had treated.  Souza requested that a 
union representative be present before she would write the report.  When 
 
Labor Relations Act, 82 WASH. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (2007) (same).  “Posting” refers to 
publishing material online, whether on a blog, on a Facebook “wall,” or uploading a video 
to YouTube.  In contrast, when one publishes a message using Twitter, the act is referred to 
as “tweeting” and the message is referred to as a “tweet.” 
 19.  Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc. & Nevada Serv. Employees Union, Local 1107, 
Affiliated with Serv. Employees Int'l Union., 351 N.L.R.B. 1250 (2007), enforced sub nom. 
Nev. Serv. Emps. Union, Local 1107 v. NLRB, 358 F. App’x. 783 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 20.  Id. at 1253. 
 21.  See id. at 1254; see also Amcast Auto. of Ind., 348 N.L.R.B. 836, 838 (2006) 
(deciding that an employee who had used a company computer during work hours to search 
the Internet for information regarding a company rumored to be purchasing the employer 
was not engaged in protected concerted activity, concluding “that the mere possibility of a 
future sale was too speculative and remote for [the employee’s] Internet activity to be 
protected under Section 7”); Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 448, 451 
(2005) (deciding that a posting by an employee on an internet forum critical of his employer 
was closely related to ongoing labor disputes and therefore protected under section 7), 
vacated sub nom. Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (holding that the “disloyal, disparaging and injurious nature” of the employee’s 
attacks on the company deprived him of protection under the Act).  For a discussion of 
disloyalty, see Matthew W. Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk Still?, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 541 (2007) (arguing “that, at best, disloyalty is worthless 
as a guide to decision; at worst, it chills speech of social value, and ought to be 
abandoned”). 
 22.  Though it was the subject of scholarly discussion; see, e.g., Rafael Gely & Leonard 
Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers, Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (2007); Katherine M. Scott, When Is Employee Blogging Protected 
by Section 7 of the NLRA?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17 (2006); Cote, supra note 18. 
 23.  See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan 
B. Kreisberg, Regional Director of Region 34, American Medical Response of Connecticut, 
Inc., No. 34-CA-12576 at 3-5 (Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter AMR Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4; see also Complaint and 
Notice of Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., No. 34-CA-12576 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 
27, 2010). 
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her request was denied, she refused to write the report.  Later that evening, 
Souza vented about the incident on her Facebook page, referring to her 
supervisor as a “17” (a term used for psychiatric patients), a “dick,” and a 
“scumbag.”24  Souza was subsequently fired, in part, for posting derogatory 
remarks about her supervisor on Facebook.25 
In fact, the NLRB began receiving complaints by employees, in the 
form of “charges,”26 since at least June 2009; in all, the NLRB documented 
approximately one hundred charges of unfair labor practices arising from 
social media activities and policies between June 2009 and April 2011.27  
While a majority of these charges have been closed with no action taken 
beyond, perhaps, a cursory investigation,28 the NLRB’s Office of the 
General Counsel has published twenty-one Advise Memoranda and 
summarized ten additional situations,29 and four ALJ decisions and one 
 
 24.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 3. 
 25.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 5.  For additional information regarding the 
Souza incident, see infra Part II.B. 
 26.  The complaint process is initiated by an employee (individually or through 
representation) filing a charge with an NLRB Regional Office.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–
101.43 (detailing the filing and adjudication process).  If the charge is determined to be of 
merit or not settled or not withdrawn, the NLRB will file a formal complaint.  29 C.F.R. § 
101.8.  If the complaint is not settled, it will be heard before an ALJ, 29 C.F.R. § 101.10, 
whose decision is filed with the Board, 29 C.F.R. § 101.11, which will either adopt, modify, 
or reject the findings and recommendations of the ALJ, 29 C.F.R. § 101.10, 101.12(a).  The 
Board’s decision is subject to review by the federal circuit court of appeals.  29 C.F.R. § 
101.14.  The employee who files a charge is generically referred to as the “Charging Party.” 
 27.  The author submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the NLRB 
seeking copies of “all charges, complaints, and completed settlements related to social 
media.”  In response, the NLRB sent a collection of documents, which included copies of 
109 charges (ninety of which were filed by individual employees), nine complaints, and five 
settlement agreements.  The documents were readily available since, by coincidence, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce had made an identical FOIA request just prior to the author’s 
own request.  See Michael J. Eastman, Exec. Dir. of Labor Law Policy, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, A Survey of Social Media Issues Before the NLRB 2 (Aug. 5, 2011), available 
at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media%20 
Survey.pdf. 
 28.  Through 2011, the majority of charges provided under the FOIA request had been 
officially closed, and for most of the closed cases, it is unknown what occurred between the 
filing of the original charge and the case being closed, i.e., the extent of any investigation, 
whether the NLRB Regional Office where the charge was filed concluded it was without 
merit, whether an informal agreement was reached between the employer and employee, or 
whether the employee abandoned or withdrew the charge. 
 29.  In certain types of cases involving novel and complex issues, the NLRB Regional 
Director may be required to submit the case for advice from the NLRB’s Office of the 
General Counsel before issuing a complaint.  29 C.F.R. § 101.8.  In April 2011, the Office 
of the General Counsel issued a memorandum requiring Regional Directors to submit for 
advice “[c]ases involving employer rules prohibiting, or discipline of employees for 
engaging in, protected concerted activity using social media, such as Facebook or Twitter.”  
Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Regional Directors, 
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Mandatory Submissions to Advice, No. GC 11-
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Board decision have been issued.  These thirty-six incidents provide 
excellent examples of the NLRB’s application of facts to its own definition 
of protected concerted activity, as well as additional associated issues.  The 
analysis underlying each of the incidents and their respective 
determinations is discussed below.30 
A. Threatening to Withhold Patient Care 
In June 2009, the senior management of a hospital became aware of 
Facebook postings by three employees in which one of the managers 
believed the employees were threatening to withhold care if they were 
personally offended by patients.31  The employees were suspended with pay 
pending a psychological exam, being formally advised their suspensions 
were due to “disparaging written comments made by you regarding patients 
and patient care that were brought to our attention.”32  The employees were 
subsequently reinstated, though a memo was placed in each of their files 
stating they had violated an Employee Behavior Policy.33 
In response to charges that the employer had engaged in unfair labor 
practices by disciplining the employees because of their Facebook 
postings,34 the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the 
Facebook postings suggested those employees might not provide 
appropriate care to the Employer’s patients and did not constitute protected 
concerted activity.35  The employees also accused the employer of unlawful 
 
11, 2011 WL 3348287, at *2 (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/ 
document.aspx/09031d458047021e.  Thirteen of the advice memoranda discussed in this 
Article, as well as all four ALJ decisions and the one Board decision, address charges that 
were included in the documents provided to this author by the NLRB.  See supra note 27 for 
a discussion of the documents provided by the NLRB referenced in this Article. 
 30.  The incidents are discussed in the following order:  first, advice memoranda (in 
reverse chronological order of when they were issued); second, ALJ decisions (in reverse 
chronological order of when they were issued); and, last, the one Board decision.  Four 
situations solely involving employer social media policies will be discussed in Part III.B. 
infra.  
 31.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Director J. 
Michael Lightner, Regional Director of Region 22, MONOC, No. 22-CA-29008, et al., 2010 
WL 4685855, at *2 (May 5, 2010)  [hereinafter  MONOC Adv. Mem.] (redacting content of 
actual postings in compliance Freedom of Information Act exemptions 6 and 7(c)), 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45803f7e3b. 
 32.  MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *2. 
 33.  MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *3. 
 34.  NLRB Charge Against Employer, No. 22-CA-29008 (Nov. 16, 2009) (copy on file 
with author). 
 35.  MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *5 (noting “[w]hile other postings on [one 
employee’s] Facebook page clearly involved protected communications regarding terms and 
conditions of employment and ongoing labor disputes, the specific comments cited by the 
Employer as the basis of the employees’ suspensions did not involve Section 7 concerns and 
were in no way related to the postings that did”). 
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surveillance of their Facebook postings.36  In general, surveillance by an 
employer can restrain employees from engaging in protected concerted 
activities.37  However, “no impression of surveillance is created where the 
employer explains that it obtained the information from other employees, 
particularly in the absence of evidence that the employer solicited the 
information.”38  Here, the managers obtained the Facebook postings from 
another employee.39 
B. Dawnmarie Souza Revisited 
As discussed above, Dawnmarie Souza was fired by AMR, in part 
because she posted disparaging remarks about her supervisor on 
Facebook.40  Part of Souza’s dispute with her employer was that she was 
denied union representation when she was ordered to write an incident 
report.41  The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that “the 
written incident report constitute[d] an investigatory interview and that 
Souza had a right to Union representation when completing the report.  
Thus, the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying Souza a 
Union representative and threatening to discipline her for invoking her 
[right to representation].”42  The General Counsel’s office further 
concluded that Souza was engaged in protected concerted activity when she 
later discussed with her coworkers, via Facebook, her run-in with her 
supervisor.43 
One issue raised in considering Souza’s charge was whether she lost 
NLRA protection by referring to her supervisor as a “17,” a “dick,” and a 
“scumbag” in her Facebook post.44  The NLRA “protects statements made 
during the course of protected conduct unless they are so egregious as to 
 
 36.  NLRB Charge Against Employer, No. 22-CA-29008, supra note 34. 
 37.  MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *5 (“Employer surveillance or creation of 
an impression of surveillance constitutes unlawful interference with Section 7 rights because 
employees should feel free to participate in union activity ‘without the fear that members of 
management are peering over their shoulders.’”) (citing Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 
257, 257 (1993)). 
 38. MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *6. 
 39. See MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *6 (noting the supervisor had informed 
the holder of the Facebook profile that the posts were obtained by a “concerned” employee; 
noting also that the holder of the Facebook profile had restricted access to her posts to her 
“friends,” and therefore “would not reasonably conclude that the Employer was directly 
monitoring her Facebook page”).  See infra Part III.C. for a further discussion of employer 
surveillance. 
 40.  See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 41.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 3. 
 42.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 6. 
 43.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9 (describing Souza’s protected concerted 
activity as “discussing supervisory actions with coworkers in her Facebook post”). 
 44.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9; see also supra text accompanying note 23. 
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remove the employee’s conduct from the protection of the Act.”45  Four 
factors are considered when determining whether an employee who is 
engaged in protected concerted activity has by “opprobrious” conduct lost 
the protection of the Act:  “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject 
matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) 
whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair 
labor practice.”46  The General Counsel’s office concluded Souza’s conduct 
was not so opprobrious as to lose the protection of the Act:  first, the 
Facebook postings did not interrupt the work of any employee because they 
occurred outside the workplace and during the nonworking time of both 
Souza and her coworkers; second, the comments were made during an 
online employee discussion of supervisory action, which is protected 
activity; third, Souza’s name-calling was not accompanied by any verbal or 
physical threats; and fourth, Souza’s Facebook postings were provoked by 
her supervisor’s unlawful refusal to provide her with a union representative 
for the completion of the incident report and by his unlawful threat to 
discipline her.47 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel also determined that 
AMR’s Internet and Blogging Policy, which prohibited employees from 
“making disparaging . . . comments when discussing the Company or the 
employee’s superiors, co-workers, and/or competitors,” was unlawful 
because it contained no limiting language to inform employees that it did 
not apply to section 7 activity.48  The NLRB settled this matter with AMR, 
in which AMR agreed to post a notice to its employees that it was revising 
its Internet and Blogging Policy, acknowledging that it improperly 
restricted its employees’ “right to engage in union activities or to discuss 
[their] wages, hours and working conditions with [their] fellow employees 
and others while not at work.”49 
C. Tweeting About Union Negotiations 
Contemporaneous with union negotiations over bonuses and other 
benefits, Thomson Reuters (“Reuters”) launched a “Destination Reuters” 
 
 45.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 
816 (1979)). 
 46.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 
816). 
 47.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9–10. 
 48.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See 
infra Part III.B., for a further discussion of the lawfulness of employer social media policies. 
 49.  NLRB Settlement Agreement, No. 34-CA-12576 (Feb. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.minnesotaemploymentlawreport.com/NLRB%20Facebook%20Settlement.pdf.  
Interestingly, the fate of Souza—i.e., whether she was to be reinstated and/or to receive back 
pay—is not mentioned in the settlement agreement. 
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Twitter feed which employees were invited to follow and to “join the 
conversation as we Tweet on major media play on Reuters and the 
competition, journalism awards and tips to help you manage your career 
better at Reuters.”50  At the same time, Reuters also issued Social Media & 
Online Communication Guidelines (“Guidelines”) and a Handbook of 
Journalism (“Handbook”) “to regulate employees’ online participation, 
including in blogs and social sites like Facebook and Twitter.”51  A Reuters 
reporter replied to the “Destination Reuters” Twitter feed announcement by 
sending a tweet stating that “one way to make this place the best place to 
work is to deal honestly with Guild members.”52  The next day, the 
journalist’s bureau chief called to “remind” the reporter that the Company’s 
Twitter policy prohibited tweeting anything that “would damage the 
reputation of Thomson Reuters” and that her tweet implied that the Reuters 
was not dealing honestly with the union.53 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that 
maintenance of the Guidelines and portions of the Handbook, as well as the 
application of the Twitter policy to the journalist’s tweet exhorting Reuters 
to “deal honestly with Guild members” violated section 8(a)(1).54  While 
Reuters’s social media policy did not explicitly prohibit section 7 activity, 
the General Counsel’s office considered the Guidelines and portions of the 
Handbook to be unlawful because they would reasonably be construed to 
apply to section 7 activity that may be critical of Reuters, but is nonetheless 
protected.55  For example, the Guidelines and the Handbook prohibited 
communications that “attack or insult[,]” or embarrass or disparage, or 
“damage the reputation” of Reuters, or are “embarrassing to others.”56  The 
General Counsel’s office considered these prohibitions as broad terms that 
would commonly apply to protected criticism of an employer’s labor 
policies or treatment of employees.57  It concluded: 
Neither the Handbook nor the Guidelines define these broad 
terms or limit them in any way that would exclude Section 7 
 
 50.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Karen 
Fernbach, Acting Regional Director of Region 2, Thomson Reuters, No. 02-CA-39682, 
2011 WL 6960026, at *5 (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem.], 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079355f (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 51.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *4. 
 52.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 53.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 54.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *14 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 55.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15. 
 56.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15. 
 57.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15. 
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activity.  On the contrary, the Employer has actually applied the 
broad language in its social media policies to restrict Section 7 
activity, invoking its policy to reprimand an employee for the 
protected exhortation to “deal honestly” with the Union.58 
D. Tweeting that TV People Are Stupid 
Brian Pedersen was a reporter with the Arizona Daily Star.  In 
response to an initiative by the Daily Star to encourage “reporters to use 
social media to get news stories out to people who might not read the 
newspaper and to drive readers to the Daily Star’s website[,]”59 Pedersen 
attended a “webinar” about how to use Twitter and opened a Twitter 
account.60  About a year later, Pederson posted a tweet stating:  “The 
Arizona Daily Star’s copy editors are the most witty and creative people in 
the world.  Or at least they think they are.”61  About two weeks later, 
Pedersen was called into a meeting with his supervisors, who expressed 
concern about his tweet and informed him he was “prohibited from airing 
his grievances or commenting about the Daily Star in any public forum.”62  
Approximately eight months later, over a period of four weeks, Pedersen 
posted a series of tweets trivializing the Tucson-area homicide rate, and 
calling “TV people” stupid in response to a misspelled word in a television 
station’s tweet.63  Pedersen was subsequently fired because he disregarded 
guidance “to refrain from using derogatory comments in any social media 
forums that may damage the goodwill of the company,” and because of his 
“inappropriate Twitter posting.”64 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded Pedersen “was 
terminated for writing inappropriate and offensive Twitter postings that did 
not involve protected concerted activity.”65  In particular, Pedersen’s 
“conduct was not protected and concerted:  it did not relate to the terms and 
conditions of his employment or seek to involve other employees in issues 
 
 58.  Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15. 
 59.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Cornele A. 
Overstreet, Regional Director of Region 28, Lee Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Arizona Daily Star, 
No. 28-CA-23267, 2011 WL 1825089, at *1 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Daily Star Adv. 
Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580495256; see 
also NLRB Charge Against Employer, No. 28-CA-23267 (Nov. 24, 2010) (copy on file with 
author). 
 60.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *1. 
 61.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(noting that the tweet was in response to certain sports headlines). 
 62.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *2–3. 
 64.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *4. 
 65.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *4. 
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related to employment.”66  Although supervisors admonished Pedersen “to 
stop airing his grievances or commenting about the Employer in any public 
forum[,]” and “to refrain from using derogatory comments in any social 
media forums that may damage the goodwill of the company”—which 
could be interpreted as overly broad rules that prohibit protected concerted 
activities—here, “the statements were made solely to the Charging Party 
[Pedersen] in the context of discipline, and in response to specific 
inappropriate conduct, and were not communicated to any other employees 
or proclaimed as new “‘rules.’”67 
E. When a Supervisor Complains About a Coworker 
Kathleen Reichle and her fellow nurses were upset that another nurse 
frequently missed her shifts, and although they had complained to their 
manager, no action had been taken to rectify the matter.68  After the nurse 
called in sick again, Reichle posted a comment on her Facebook page 
complaining about the nurse, ending with:  “Anymore details, contact 
me.”69  Reichle was subsequently fired because she had “talked badly about 
the hospital” in violation of the hospital’s social media policy.70 
The Board considers an employer to have violated section 8(a)(1) of 
the NLRA if it maintains a work rule that would “reasonably tend to chill 
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”71  While a rule that 
explicitly restricts section 7 activities is unlawful, so too can a rule that 
implicitly restricts section 7 activities if one of three conditions is met:  “(1) 
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 
 
 66.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *5. 
 67.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *5–6. 
 68.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle 
Kentov, Regional Director of Region 12, Flagler Hospital, No. 12-CA-27031, 2011 WL 
5115074, at *1 (May 10, 2011) [hereinafter Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806bab9c; see also NLRB Charge 
Against Employer, No. 12-CA-26947 (Nov. 16, 2010) (copy on file with author). 
 69.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Reichle withdrew her original charge that she was fired in violation of the NLRA because 
she was classified as a supervisor.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2.   Section 
7 applies to employees.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage 
in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection”) (emphasis 
added).  And the NLRA’s definition of employee excludes supervisors.  29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  
The General Counsel’s office concluded, however, that had she not been a supervisor, 
Reichle’s postings would have clearly been protected concerted activity.  Reichle 
subsequently filed a new charge alleging that certain provisions of the hospital’s social 
media policy were unlawful.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2.  
 71.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 
N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced sub nom. Lafayette Park Hotel v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 52 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) 
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”72 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that three of 
the hospital’s policies were unlawful.  The hospital prohibited employees 
from using any social media that “may in any way violate, compromise, or 
disregard . . . the rights and reasonable expectations as to privacy or 
confidentiality of any person or entity.”73  Since the hospital did not 
provide a definition or guidance as to what it considers to be private or 
confidential, the General Counsel’s office concluded the rule was overly 
broad, in that it could reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting protected 
employee discussion of wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment.74 
A second hospital rule prohibited the use of social media to post 
“[a]ny communication or post which constitutes embarrassment, 
harassment or defamation of the Hospital” or of “any employee, officer, 
board member, representative or staff member.”75  The General Counsel’s 
office noted that this particular rule was the one relied upon by the hospital 
to fire Reichle because of her Facebook postings, which would have been 
protected if she had been a statutory employee.76  As such, the hospital’s 
“interpretation and application of that [rule] to cover the Charging Party’s 
expression of frustration over a colleague’s conduct that frequently resulted 
in heavier demands on the remaining staff could reasonably lead employees 
to conclude that protected complaints about their working conditions are 
prohibited.”77 
The final rule considered by the NLRB’s Office of the General 
Counsel prohibited “statements which lack . . . truthfulness or which might 
cause damage to or does damage the reputation or goodwill of the Hospital 
. . . .”78  The General Counsel’s office concluded this rule was ambiguous 
because its terms could be applied to protected criticism of the hospital’s 
labor policies or treatment of employees.79  In addition, this last rule 
contained a savings clause, stating its prohibitions were limited to conduct 
“or form of expression which, under the law, is or may be 
 
 72.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (citing Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004)). 
 73.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 
 75.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 76.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3; see supra note 70 (discussing 
Reichle’s lack of standing under section 7 because she was a supervisor and not an 
“employee”). 
 77.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3. 
 78.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3. 
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impermissible.”80  The Board has held that an employer may not prohibit 
employee activity protected by the NLRA and then seek to escape the 
consequences of the prohibition by a general reference to rights protected 
by law.81  More specifically, the Board has explained that “these general 
provisions, known as savings clauses or disclaimers, that employers tack 
onto the end of a rule that otherwise prohibits, coerces, or restrains 
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, do not make an 
otherwise unlawful rule lawful.”82 
F. Complaining About Work on a U.S. Senator’s Facebook Wall 
In January 2011, Lori Russell-Head, a dispatcher for a company that 
provides emergency and nonemergency medical transportation and fire 
protection services in Indiana, posted a message on Senator Dick Lugar’s 
(R-IN) Facebook wall, complaining that she and her husband were 
underpaid employees of a private contractor providing public services.83  
Russell-Head claimed that “she wanted to make Senator Lugar aware that 
she disagreed with how emergency medical services were handled in 
Indiana and that her kind of company was not helping the current 
situation.”84  Russell-Head was subsequently fired “for publicly posting 
disparaging remarks about the Employer and confidential information 
about its response to a service call[,]” and because her Facebook comments 
violated the Employer’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct policy.85 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel determined Russell-
Head’s firing was not unlawful because she did not engage in concerted 
activity.  She did not discuss her Facebook posting with any other 
employee; there had been no employee meetings or any attempt to initiate 
group action; she was not trying to take employee complaints to 
management; and, admittedly, did not expect Senator Lugar to take any 
action that would affect her employment situation.86  Rather, she was 
 
 80.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 81.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3; Tower Indus. Inc., d/b/a Allied 
Mech., 349 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1084 (2007) (“An employer may not specifically prohibit 
employee activity protected by the Act and then seek to escape the consequences of the 
specific prohibition by a general reference to rights protected by law.”). 
 82.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3. 
 83.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rik Lineback, 
Regional Director of Region 25,  Rural Metro, No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 2960970, at *1 
(June 29, 2011) [hereinafter Rural/Metro Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055fad2; see also NLRB Charge 
Against Employer, No. 25-CA-31802 (Mar. 14, 2011) (copy on file with author). 
 84.  Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *1. 
 85.  Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *2. 
 86.  Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *2. 
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“merely trying to make a public official aware of the state of emergency 
medical services in Indiana.”87 
G. Discussing Tip Sharing with a Step-Sister 
In February 2011, Bradley Denney, a bartender at JT’s Porch Saloon 
& Eatery, engaged in a Facebook “conversation” with his step-sister.88  In 
response to his step-sister’s inquiry as to how work was going, Denney 
responded that he had not received a raise in five years and that he was 
doing the waitresses’ work without tips; he also called the employer’s 
customers “rednecks” and stated that he “hoped they choked on glass as 
they drove home drunk.”89  JT’s maintains an unwritten policy, 
communicated to bartenders when they are hired, that waitresses do not 
share their tips with the bartenders even though the bartenders help the 
waitresses serve food.90  Although Denney discussed the tip sharing policy 
with another bartender and she agreed the policy “sucked,” they never took 
their complaint to management; nor did any other coworkers participate in 
the Facebook conversation between Denney and his step-sister.91  Two 
months later, Denney was fired “for his Facebook posting about the 
Employer’s customers.”92 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded Denney was 
not unlawfully fired because he did not engage in concerted activity: 
Here, there is no evidence of concerted activity.  Although the 
Charging Party’s posting addressed his terms and conditions of 
employment, he did not discuss his Facebook posting with any of 
his fellow employees either before or after he wrote it, and none 
of his coworkers responded to the posting.  There had been no 
employee meetings or any attempt to initiate group action with 
regard to the tipping policy or the awarding of raises.  There also 
was no effort to take the bartenders’ complaints about these 
matters to management.  In this instance, the Charging Party was 
merely responding to a question from his step-sister about how 
 
 87.  Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *2. 
 88.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Gail R. 
Moran, Acting Regional Director of Region 13, JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., No. 13-
CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964, at *1 (July 7, 2011) [hereinafter JT’s Porch Adv. Mem.], 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c6; see also 
N.L.R.B. Charge Against Employer, No. 13-CA-46689 (Apr. 5, 2011) (copy on file with 
author). 
 89.  JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1.  
 90.  JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1. 
 91.  JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1. 
 92.  JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1.  Ironically, the day before he was 
formally fired, the owner of JT’s Porch informed Denney that “his services were no longer 
required” through a Facebook posting.  JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1. 
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his evening at work went.  And this internet “conversation” did 
not grow out his prior conversation with a fellow bartender 
months earlier about the tipping policy.93 
H. Expressing Frustration with Wal-Mart 
In October 2010, after an interaction with a new Assistant Manager, 
Brian Morris, a Wal-Mart employee, posted on his Facebook page, “Wuck 
Falmart! I swear if this tyranny doesn’t end in this store they are about to 
get a wakeup call because lots are about to quit!”94  Two coworkers posted 
short comments generally agreeing with Morris’s sentiments, and Morris 
posted another comment criticizing the Assistant Manager.95  Morris was 
subsequently disciplined for his Facebook postings.96  The NLRB’s Office 
of the General Counsel concluded that Morris’s charge against Wal-Mart 
should be dismissed because he did not engage in concerted activity; his 
postings were merely “an expression of an individual gripe.”97 
I. Talking About Mentally Disabled Clients 
In January 2011, an employee of Martin House, a nonprofit residential 
facility for homeless people, engaged in a “conversation” on her Facebook 
wall in which she stated it was “spooky” being all alone “in a mental 
institution.”98  No coworkers were involved in the conversation; however, a 
former client was Facebook friends with the employee and saw the posts 
and reported them to the employer.99  The employee was subsequently fired 
as a result of the Facebook posts.100  The NLRB’s Office of the General 
Counsel concluded the employee’s firing was not unlawful because she had 
not engaged in concerted activity.101  Not only were no coworkers involved 
in the Facebook conversation, it did not even mention any terms or 
 
 93.  JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *2. 
 94.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Daniel L. 
Hubbel, Regional Director of Region 17, Wal-Mart, No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 WL 3223852, 
at *1 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Wal-Mart Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e73d; see also N.L.R.B. Charge 
Against Employer, No. 17-CA-25030 (Dec. 9, 2010) (copy on file with author). 
 95.  Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *1. 
 96.  Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *1. 
 97.  Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *2. 
 98.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan B. 
Kresiberg, Regional Director of Region 34, Martin House, No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 
3223853, at *1 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Martin House Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e73e. 
 99.  Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *1. 
 100.  Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *1. 
 101.  Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *2. 
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conditions of employment.102  The employee “was merely communicating 
with her personal friends about what was happening on her shift.”103 
J. Complaining About a Dispatcher 
In December 2010, Gregory Crawford, a truck driver employed by 
Buel, Inc., was stuck outside of Laramie, Wyoming, due to snow and was 
unable to reach a dispatcher.104  He posted a complaint about his situation 
on his Facebook page.105  Crawford was subsequently demoted, after which 
he quit, claiming he was constructively discharged as a result of his 
Facebook posting.106  The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel 
concluded that Crawford had not engaged in concerted activity.107  Rather 
than collectively communicating with fellow employees regarding work 
conditions, the General Counsel’s office concluded Crawford “was simply 
expressing his own frustration and boredom while stranded by the weather, 
by griping about his inability to reach the on-call dispatcher.”108 
Crawford also accused his employer of surveillance of his Facebook 
account.109  Here, Crawford had “friended” his supervisor on Facebook, 
essentially inviting her to view his Facebook page.110  Further, there was no 
evidence that the supervisor “was acting at the Employer’s direction or was 
on Facebook for the sole purpose of monitoring employee postings.”111 
K. Accusing a Supervisor of Having an Affair 
In 2010, an employee of Sagepoint Financial, Inc., sent a number of 
email messages and wrote several Facebook posts complaining about his 
situation at work, namely, that his supervisor had been chosen over him for 
a promotion, she had hired two incompetent employees, and suggesting 
that she was having an affair with one of them.112  In Facebook posts, he 
 
 102.  Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *2. 
 103.  Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *2. 
 104.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jane North, 
Acting Regional Director of Region 11, Buel, Inc., No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671, at 
*1 (July 28, 2011) [hereinafter Buel Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45805fa7fc;  see also N.L.R.B. Amend. 
Charge Against Employer, No. 11-CA-22936 (Mar. 28, 2011) (copy on file with author). 
 105.  Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *1. 
 106.  Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *2. 
 107.  Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *2. 
 108.  Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *2. 
 109.  N.L.R.B. Amend. Charge Against Employer, No. 11-CA-22936, supra note 104. 
 110.  Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *3. 
 111.  Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *3. 
 112.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1. 
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stated that he hated his supervisor and called her a bitch.113  Although the 
employee was initially Facebook friends with several coworkers and 
supervisors, he subsequently “unfriended” most of his coworkers and 
continued to vent online about his supervisor.114  The employee was 
initially reprimanded and admonished to “conduct [himself] in a 
professional manner; do not disrespect other employees or your 
management team or make negative comments.”115  The employer 
ultimately terminated the employee “for continual behavior problems and 
his inability to interact with his coworkers and manager, referencing his e-
mails and Facebook postings.”116 
In concluding the employer did not unlawfully fire the employee 
because he was not engaged in concerted activity,117 the NLRB’s Office of 
the General Counsel stated: 
Here, the Charging Party’s repeated Facebook complaints about 
his supervisor and what he perceived to be her preferential 
treatment of two coworkers were made solely on his own behalf 
and were not designed to advance any cause other than his own.  
Moreover, he did not evidence any intention of instigating group 
action or bringing any group concern to management.  When 
coworkers participated in these Facebook “conversations,” they 
did so only to express amusement or sympathy but not because 
they shared a common concern about the effects of the 
supervisor’s conduct upon their terms and conditions of 
employment.118 
L. Calling a Fellow Bartender a Cheater 
In late 2010, Janelle Morehart began posting her concerns on 
Facebook about a new fellow bartender, a friend of the new general 
manager of Rock Wood Fired Pizza & Spirits, claiming he was a “cheater” 
and “screwing” customers because he was using mixes instead of premium 
liquors, and stating:  “Dishonest employees along with management that 
turns their head, will be the death of any business.”119  However, other 
 
 113.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1. 
 114.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1–2. 
 115.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 116.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 117.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2. 
 118.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *3. 
 119.  Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *1–2 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also N.L.R.B. Charge Against Employer, No. 19-CA-32981 (Feb. 28, 2011) (copy on 
file with author). 
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employees were concerned that customers would see the posts.120  Morehart 
was subsequently fired for “[u]se of unprofessional communication on her 
[F]acebook to fellow employees viewed by employees.”121 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded Morehart’s 
activity was not protected under the NRLA.122  However, the General 
Counsel’s office did agree that the employer’s “Team Member Conduct & 
Work Rules” were unlawfully broad because the prohibitions on 
“disrespectful conduct” and “inappropriate conversations” would 
reasonably be construed by employees to preclude section 7 activity.123  
However, discipline imposed under an unlawfully overly broad rule 
violates the NLRA only when the affected employee has been engaging in 
protected concerted activity.124  As noted by the Office of the General 
Counsel: 
Here, the Charging Party’s Facebook posts regarding her fellow 
bartender’s job performance had only a very attenuated 
connection with terms and conditions of employment.  She made 
the posts because she was upset that he was passing off low-
grade drinks as premium liquor and management was condoning 
the action . . . .  Although she later stated that she was concerned 
that the bartender’s conduct would cause customers to stop 
buying drinks or lower their tips if they found out, she did not 
state this concern in her posts.  And this assertion is belied by the 
fact that she was communicating with customers about the 
bartenders’ [sic] conduct, which if anything would cause the 
impact on business she now asserts she was trying to prevent.125 
M. Posting That You Are a Hair Away from Setting It Off 
In January 2011, a Frito-Lay employee was upset that his supervisor 
would subtract “attendance points” if the employee left early because he 
was not feeling well, posting his frustration on Facebook:  “I think they 
trying to give me a reason to be fired because I’m about a hair away from 
setting it off in that BITCH.hahahaha.”126  The HR Manager considered the 
 
 120.  A coworker responded to the post indicating Morehart should be careful about 
posting on Facebook.  Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2 (citing a coworker who 
posted:  “[I] agree . . . careful what u post, feel me?”). 
 121.  Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122.  Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2. 
 123.  Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124.  Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2. 
 125.  Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *3. 
 126.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Richard L. 
Ahearn, Regional Director of Region 19, Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 36-CA-10882, 2011 WL 
4526828, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Frito-Lay Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580681026. 
FINAL DRAFT  
976 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
employee’s post a threat and suspended the employee pending an 
investigation, and subsequently fired the employee because his “Facebook 
comments were inappropriate, threatening and violent.”127 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded there was no 
evidence of concerted activity.128  “Although the [employee’s] postings 
addressed his terms and conditions of employment, he did not seek to 
initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group action, and none of his 
coworkers responded to the postings with similar concerns.”129 
N. Using an Obscenity as Your Job Title on LinkedIn 
In early 2010, an employee of Schulte, Roth & Zabel was invited by a 
fellow employee to join the LinkedIn online networking site.130  The invited 
employee accepted the invitation, which, because LinkedIn is a 
professional- and business-related website, included the entry of job-related 
information, such as the name of employer and job title.  As a joke, 
thinking only his supervisor would see it, the invited employee entered his 
job title as “fucktard.”131  A few months later, as the employer began 
investigating setting up its own LinkedIn site, it began viewing its own 
employees’ profiles on LinkedIn and discovered the employee’s joke job 
title; thereafter discharging him for violating the employer’s Electronic 
Communication Policy by disparaging the company.132  The NLRB’s 
Office of the General Counsel fundamentally concluded that the 
employee’s LinkedIn “joke” was clearly not protected concerted activity.133 
The employee had claimed the LinkedIn job description was merely a 
pretext for dismissing him due to his conversations with other employees 
about the employer’s overtime compensation, noting the LinkedIn “joke” 
was online for over a year before he was fired, though he had begun the 
overtime conversations only two months earlier.134  The NLRB’s Office of 
the General Counsel noted that “timing alone does not establish a prima 
facie case.”135  In particular, there was no evidence the employer was even 
aware of the employee’s overtime discussions.136 
 
 127.  Frito-Lay Adv. Mem., supra note 126 at *2. 
 128.  Frito-Lay Adv. Mem., supra note 126 at *2. 
 129.  Frito-Lay Adv. Mem., supra note 126 at *2. 
 130.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Elbert F. 
Tellem, Acting Regional Director for Region 2, Schulte, Roth & Zabel, No. 02-CA-60476, 
2011 WL 5122642, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem.], 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806bab9f. 
 131.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1. 
 132.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1. 
 133.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1. 
 134.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1. 
 135.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1 (citing Wright Line, 251 
N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (requiring that the General Counsel make a prima facie 
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O. Complaining About a Customer on Facebook 
During a lunch break in April 2011, a service representative of a credit 
union posted a comment on his Facebook page describing an interaction 
with a customer that resulted in the customer lodging a complaint against 
the representative (based on the interaction, not the Facebook posting).137  
The employee’s initial posting was followed by an online “conversation” 
with two friends generally denigrating the customer and the employee’s 
supervisor.138  A few days later, the employee again vented about work via 
Facebook, with a customer “friend” joining the “conversation.”139  The 
employee was subsequently fired for making derogatory statements about a 
customer.140  In concluding the employee was not engaged in protected 
concerted activity,141 the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel stated: 
Here, the Charging Party’s . . . Facebook post, for which he was 
discharged, was merely an expression of an individual gripe 
about a customer.  The Charging Party admitted that he posted 
this comment because he was frustrated and that he was not 
trying to get other employees to take any action.  Indeed, the post 
contains no language suggesting that he sought to initiate or 
induce coworkers to engage in group action, and the post did not 
grow out of a prior discussion about terms and conditions of 
employment with his coworkers or even reference terms and 
conditions of employment.  As he put it, he was merely 
“venting.”142 
P. Posting on Facebook That a Coworker’s “Sucking His Teeth” is 
Driving You Nuts 
In January 2011, a respiratory therapist was traveling in an ambulance 
with coworkers to pick up a patient.  One of the coworkers kept sucking his 
 
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a motivating factor in 
the employer’s decision; and once this is established, the burden will shift to the employer to 
demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the 
protected conduct)). 
 136.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1.  See infra notes 352-54 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the lawfulness of the employer’s Electronic 
Communication Policy. 
 137.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda Pate 
Jones, Regional Director of Region 27, Public Service Credit Union, No. 27-CA-21923, 
2011 WL 5822506, at *1 (Nov. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Public Service Credit Union Adv. 
Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806fc018. 
 138.  Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *2. 
 139.  Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *2. 
 140.  Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *2. 
 141.  Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem.,  supra note 137, at *3. 
 142.  Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem.,  supra note 137, at *3. 
FINAL DRAFT  
978 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
teeth during the ride to pick up the patient, irritating the therapist to the 
point she used her iPhone to post on her Facebook page, “REALLY!!!! 
Must you suck your teeth every 30 seconds.  It is driving me nuts.”143  Two 
of her Facebook nonemployee friends responded with supporting 
comments and, in reply, the employee wrote:  “Actually they are about to 
get, beat senseless with a ventilator.  [sic]  It’s in the back of an ambulance 
and I can’t get away from them.  UGH!!!”144  A coworker saw the 
Facebook post and reported it to the employer, considering it a threat.145  
The therapist was suspended for two days “because of her negative and 
threatening Facebook comments” about her coworker.146 
In concluding the employee was not engaged in protected concerted 
activity and therefore the employer did not violate the Act by disciplining 
her,147 the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel stated: 
The Charging Party’s . . . post was not protected because it did 
not concern terms and conditions of employment.  She was 
merely complaining about the irritating sounds her coworker was 
making during the transport that evening, and was not even 
suggesting that the Employer should do anything about it.  
Therefore, her complaint about the co-worker’s noises, and her 
alleged threat to hit him with a ventilator to stop them, is not 
Section 7 protected.148 
Q. Accusing Your Employer of Fraud 
During the early part of 2011, an accountant-employee of TAW, Inc., 
was working with an outside auditor to complete the employer’s annual 
audit.149  During the audit, the employee’s supervisor informed her that the 
supervisor had made a serious accounting error that resulted in a large 
overstatement of revenue and rather than correct the error, the employer’s 
Chief Operating Officer had decided to allocate it over the rest of the 
year.150  The employee was concerned this tactic contravened generally 
 
 143.  Advice Memorandum for the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wayne Gold, 
Regional Director of Region 5, Children’s National Medical Center, No. 05-CA-36658, 
2011 WL 6009620, at *1 (Nov. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. 
Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806fc01d. 
 144.  Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *1. 
 145.  Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *1. 
 146.  Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *1. 
 147.  Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *2. 
 148.  Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *2. 
 149.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ronald K. 
Hooks, Regional Director of Region 26, TAW, Inc., No. 26-CA-63082, 2011 WL 6543304, 
at *1 (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter TAW Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580755f55. 
 150.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1. 
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accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), particularly because the 
employee was going to be asked to sign a letter of representation at the 
conclusion of the audit stating that, to the best of her knowledge, the 
information was true, accurate, and correct, and that she was not aware of 
any fraud.151  The employee ultimately discussed the situation with the 
employer’s general counsel, who promised to look into the matter.152  On 
April 15, when the audit was complete, the employee confirmed the error 
had not been corrected and refused to sign the letter of representation.153 
A meeting was scheduled for April 18 with the employee, her 
supervisor, the general counsel, and the outside auditor.  Prior to the April 
18 meeting, the employee posted on her Facebook page, “I wonder if 
accounting degrees used to be given out based on different criteria since I 
am fairly certain GAAP standards have always deemed certain things 
fraud.”154  Although the employer was aware of the employee’s Facebook 
post prior to the April 18 meeting, it was not discussed at the meeting.155  
However, at the meeting, the auditor assured the employee that the 
employer was not engaged in fraud and that the audit conformed to 
generally accepted accounting principles, and the employee signed the 
letter of representation at the end of the meeting.156 
A few days later, the employer’s general counsel informed the 
employee that the employer was aware of the employee’s Facebook post 
suggesting the employer was engaged in fraud, and asked the employee to 
remove the post.157  The employee did not believe she should be required to 
remove the post and did not do so.158  A few days later the employee was 
fired for refusing to remove the post.159 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the employee 
was not engaged in conduct protected by section 7.160  In particular, the 
General Counsel’s office determined that the employee was informed at the 
April 18 meeting that the employer was not engaged in fraud; therefore, she 
was aware her Facebook post was false and her subsequent insistence on 
retaining the post was not protected activity.161 
 
 151.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1. 
 152.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1. 
 153.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1. 
 154.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1. 
 155.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. 
 156.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. 
 157.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. 
 158.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. 
 159.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. 
 160.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. 
 161.  TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. (citing Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 351 
N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2007) (“Statements are unprotected if they are maliciously untrue, 
i.e., if they are made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth 
or falsity.”)). 
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R. Complaining that Coworkers Are “Narcs” 
At the end of their shifts, bank tellers at Copiah Bank are required to 
report a list of transactions to the bank’s main branch so that it can balance 
the transactions on an ongoing basis throughout the day.162  On one 
particular day, one of the bank tellers was blamed for a delay in balancing 
the transactions because she could not send her transactions at the usual 
time because a customer was still in the bank.163  Later that evening, the 
teller posted on her Facebook page, “[h]ates it when idiot people narc and 
they have no clue what they are talking about!!”164  In response to the post, 
there was a short online “conversation” between the teller and a 
nonemployee relative.165  In addition, a coworker from the main branch 
asked, via Facebook, whether the teller was talking about the coworker, to 
which the teller replied, “[n]ot just you but everybody else down there.”166 
The following day, the teller was instructed to remove the Facebook 
post, which she did.167  In addition, the teller apologized, via Facebook, to 
the coworker in the main branch.168  The next day, the teller was informed 
that the CEO of the bank had ordered the teller’s termination because he 
“didn’t like to be called an idiot.”169  However, a few days later, the CEO 
reconsidered and told the teller she could return to her job if she would 
issue an apology to all bank employees, which she refused to do.170 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that the teller 
did not post her comment on her Facebook page in furtherance of concerted 
activity for mutual aid or protection—the teller admitted that she was not 
speaking on behalf of any other employees, nor was there evidence that she 
was looking to engage in group action when she posted her comments on 
 
 162.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Kathleen 
McKinney, Regional Director of Region 15, Copiah Bank, No. 15-CA-61204, 2011 WL 
6543300, at *1 (Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Copiah Bank Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580755f54. 
 163.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1. 
 164.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2. The NLRB recognized the bank 
teller “was not referring literally to narcotics or a narcotics agent, but was using ‘narc’ in the 
colloquial sense of ‘tattling’ on someone else.”  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at 
*n1. 
 165.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1. 
 166.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1. (implying “down there” meant the 
bank’s main branch). 
 167.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1. 
 168.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1. 
 169.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2. 
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Facebook.171  As such, the bank did not violate the NLRA by discharging 
her.172 
S. Poor Performance Coupled with Facebook Postings 
A director at Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Center, a 
provider of therapy services to individuals and families who are affected by 
domestic violence or sexual abuse (as well as offenders), was monitoring 
one of the therapists for poor performance, particularly conduct during 
therapy sessions.173  At one point during this period, the director announced 
at a staff meeting that the therapist was to be replaced for certain group 
therapy sessions.  That night, the therapist posted a complaint about work 
on her Facebook page, to which friends and relatives responded.174  The 
following day, however, in response to the Facebook post, a coworker 
inquired, “[i]s this where we can complain about work?”175  The therapist 
and the coworker then exchanged a few messages discussing how to cope 
with their boss.176  Another therapist reported the Facebook postings to the 
director.177  Due to further complaints about the therapist’s performance, 
the director brought the therapist into his office to discharge her.  The 
conversation began with a discussion of the therapist’s Facebook posts; 
however, the therapist left the meeting before the director could address her 
performance issues.178 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that the 
therapist was not engaged in protected concerted activity; here, the 
therapist’s Facebook posting was merely an expression of an individual 
gripe about an action by the director that affected only the therapist.179  The 
Office of the General Counsel stated: 
The posting contained no language suggesting that she sought to 
initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group action.  And the 
only co-worker who commented in response to the posting stated 
that he did not think that the Charging Party’s post was an 
 
 171.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2. 
 172.  Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2. 
 173.  See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda 
Pate Jones, Regional Director of Region 27, Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment 
Center, No. 27-CA-065577, 2011 WL 6543306, at *1 (Dec. 6, 2011) [hereinafter 
Intermountain Adv. Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 
09031d458077b79d. 
 174.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *2. 
 175.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 176.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. 
 177.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. 
 178.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. 
 179.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. 
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attempt to change anything at work.  The only other therapist in 
the office not only did not join in the “discussion” but viewed the 
posting as inappropriate and reported it to the Director.180 
Further, the Office of the General Counsel concluded there was ample 
evidence to support the employer’s assertion that it would have discharged 
the therapist for ongoing performance issues regardless of her Facebook 
posting.181  The Office of the General Counsel also rejected the therapist’s 
claim that the employer had engaged in unlawful surveillance of her 
Facebook activities, noting there was no evidence that the employer 
solicited the information; instead, the employer learned about the 
therapist’s Facebook posting from her coworker.182 
T. Commenting to Former Coworkers 
A hospital nurse who had been transferred from the intensive care unit 
(ICU) initiated an email exchange through Facebook with a former 
coworker—who still worked at the hospital in the ICU—in which the nurse 
made derogatory comments about the ICU supervisor.183  The coworker 
took exception to the nurse’s comments and informed the nurse’s 
supervisor about the comments, at which point the nurse was suspended 
pending an investigation.184  One week later, the nurse was fired based on 
allegations of sexual harassment that arose during the investigation.185 
At issue was the fact that the discharge occurred close in time to the 
email exchange with the coworker.186  However, the NLRB’s Office of the 
General Counsel concluded the suspension and discharge did not violate 
section 8(a)(1) because the nurse was not engaged in protected section 7 
conduct.187  In particular: 
The Charging Party’s communication with Former Co-worker 
was not concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, but 
merely a personal gripe about Charging Party’s former 
supervisors.  The communication was not an attempt to initiate 
group action, and it did not involve a discussion among 
employees regarding their shared concerns about working 
 
 180.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. 
 181.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. 
 182.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. 
 183.  See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle 
Kentov, Regional Director of Region 12, Miami Jewish Health Systems, No. 12-CA-65993, 
2011 WL 6960023, *1 (Dec. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem.], 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079355d. 
 184.  Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2. 
 185.  Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2. 
 186.  Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2. 
 187.  Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2. 
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conditions; indeed, the only recipient of the emails was Former 
Co-worker, and she not only did not share Charging Party’s 
concerns but found the emails inappropriate and reported them to 
her manager.  There is no evidence that the Charging Party’s 
statements were a continuation of earlier concerted discussions or 
other activities.188 
As such, even if the nurse was discharged as a result of the email 
messages as opposed to the alleged harassment—which appears to have 
been the motive for the employer’s action—the nurse was not engaged in 
protected concerted activity.189 
U. Miscellaneous Social Media Incidents 
On January 24, 2012, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel released a 
memorandum summarizing fourteen charges “concerning the protected 
and/or concerted nature of employees’ social media postings and the 
lawfulness of employers’ social media policies and rules,” which have been 
presented to the Regional Offices and are then submitted to the NLRB’s 
Division of Advice for consideration by the Office of the General 
Counsel.190  Based on the facts presented in the memorandum, four of the 
incidents have been the focus of formal Advice Memoranda and have 
already been discussed.191  Of the remaining ten incidents:  one involves 
protected concerted activity subject to an overly-broad social media 
policy;192 two involve unprotected activity, but still overly-broad social 
media policies;193 four involve protected concerted activity with no 
discussion of the employer’s social media policy;194 and three solely 
involve discussions of the employer’s social media policy.195  The seven 
incidents involving online postings summarized in this latest memorandum 
are discussed below. 
 
 188.  Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *3. 
 189.  Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2. 
 190.  Memorandum from Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB to All Regional 
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Report of the Acting Gen. Counsel 
Concerning Social Media Cases, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Acting General Counsel’s 
Memo], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567. 
 191.  See supra Parts II.J., L., M., and P.  It can only be presumed that the remaining ten 
incidents have not been the subject of formal Advice Memoranda, as the employers and 
Charging Parties are not identified in the Acting General Counsel’s Memo. 
 192.  See infra Part II.U.1. 
 193.  See infra Parts II.U.2. and 3. 
 194.  See infra Parts II.U.4., 5., 6., and 7. 
 195.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 13–18; infra Part III.B. 
(discussing social media policies). 
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1. Posting that Your Employer Had “Messed Up” 
After a collections agency employee was transferred to a position she 
believed would lead to lower compensation, she posted on her Facebook 
wall, using expletives, that her employer had “messed up” and “she was 
done with being a good employee.”196  Approximately ten coworkers and 
the employee’s immediate supervisor were among her Facebook friends, 
and at least two coworkers posted supportive comments, along with a 
number of former coworkers.197  The next day, the employee was fired due 
to her Facebook comments.198  The NRLB’s Office of the General Counsel 
concluded the employer’s rule prohibiting “[m]aking disparaging 
comments about the company through any media, including online blogs, 
other electronic media or through the media” was unlawful because it 
would reasonably be construed to restrict section 7 activity—for example, 
prohibiting statements that the employer was not treating employees fairly 
or paying them sufficiently.199 
The General Counsel’s office also concluded that the employee was 
engaged in protected concerted activity:  she initiated her Facebook 
discussion after being transferred to a less-lucrative position; coworkers 
responded, echoing their frustrations with the employer’s treatment of 
employees; as such, the initial posting and follow-up discussion “clearly 
involved complaints about working conditions . . . .”200  The General 
Counsel’s office concluded that the employee was fired in violation of 
section 8(a)(1) because it was done pursuant to an overly broad non-
disparagement rule.201 
2. Complaining About a Reprimand 
After being reprimanded by a supervisor in front of a Regional 
Manager for not performing a task she had never been told to perform, an 
employee of a home-improvement store used her phone during her lunch 
break to update her Facebook status with a comment that included an 
expletive with the store’s name.202  Four individuals, including one 
coworker, indicated they “Liked” the employee’s status comment.203  The 
employee posted another Facebook comment, and had some face-to-face 
conversations with coworkers about the incident, but the general responses 
 
 196.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 3. 
 197.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 4. 
 198.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 4. 
 199.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 4. 
 200.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 5. 
 201.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 5. 
 202.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 6. 
 203.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 6. 
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of coworkers were limited to sympathy for the employee’s plight.204  Six 
weeks after the original incident, the employee was fired due to her 
Facebook postings.205  Subsequent to the employee’s dismissal, the 
employer issued a new social media policy, providing that, “in external 
social networking situations, employees should generally avoid identifying 
themselves as the Employer’s employees, unless there was a legitimate 
business need to do so or when discussing terms and conditions of 
employment in an appropriate manner.”206 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the employee’s 
Facebook posts were not protected because they “were merely an 
expression of an individual gripe[,]” and because there were no other 
efforts to induce or prepare for group action.207  However, the General 
Counsel’s office took issue with the employer’s social media policy—in 
particular, its restriction to only “appropriate” employment-related 
discussions.208  The policy provided no definition or examples of what 
would be appropriate or inappropriate discussions; “employees would 
therefore reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit protected activity, 
including criticism of the Employer’s labor policies, treatment of 
employees, and terms and conditions of employment.”209 
3. Ranting Against Coworkers 
An employee who had become the target of coworkers’ insults and 
threats posted a rant on Facebook against those coworkers and her 
employer, stating that she hated people at work and wanted to be left 
alone.210  The employee was fired due, in part, to her Facebook posting.211  
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the employee was 
not engaged in concerted activity because she was expressing personal 
anger with coworkers and the employer that were made solely on her 
own.212  However, the General Counsel’s office concluded that the 
employer’s social media policy, which prohibited employees “from using 
social media to engage in unprofessional communication that could 
 
 204.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 6. 
 205.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7. 
 206.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7. 
 207.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7. 
 208.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7. 
 209.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 8.  The General Counsel’s 
Office concluded also that the social media policy’s “savings clause” was insufficient to 
cure the ambiguities within the policy.  See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 
190, at 8. 
 210.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 11. 
 211.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12. 
 212.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12. 
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negatively impact the Employer’s reputation or interfere with the 
Employer’s mission or unprofessional/inappropriate communication 
regarding members of the Employer’s community,” was unlawfully broad 
in violation of section 8(a)(1) because it would reasonably be construed to 
chill employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.213 
4. Complaining About Sexist Remarks 
After a male manager remarked to the Charging Party, a female, that 
he was not surprised she and a fellow female coworker had not been at 
work the previous day because of a severe snowstorm, and after the 
Charging Party had not received a response from her supervisor or the HR 
Assistant to her complaint about what she perceived to be this sexist 
remark by the manager, she used her cell phone to post a comment on her 
Facebook page, indicating, with some profanity, that “she did not want to 
be told that she was less of a person because she was a female.”214  This led 
to a Facebook “conversation” over the next few hours with various friends, 
only one of whom was a coworker, in which the Charging Party made a 
number of derogatory remarks about the manager, though without 
expressly naming him.215  A week later, after a coworker was fired (for 
unrelated activities), the Charging Party posted additional Facebook 
comments about her work situation.216 
The Charging Party was an administrative assistant to whom many 
coworkers would turn to for advice about work problems.217  In a meeting 
with the employer’s President following the Facebook postings, the 
President stated that the Charging Party had previously been warned not to 
get involved with other employees’ problems.  The Charging Party was 
then fired because she “had continued to voice her opinions on Facebook 
on company time . . . .”218  Here, the NLRB’s Office of the General 
Counsel concluded that the Charging Party had been engaged in protected 
concerted activity because she often had discussions with fellow employees 
about terms and conditions of employment, and her Facebook postings 
“precipitated her discharge because the Employer perceived that she would 
not comply with his oral warning not to engage in protected conversations 
 
 213.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12.  Although the employee 
was fired for violating the employer’s overly broad social media policy, her discharge did 
not violate section 8(a)(1) because she was not fired for engaging in concerted activity.  
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12. 
 214.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 18. 
 215.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 18–19. 
 216.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 19. 
 217.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 18. 
 218.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 19. 
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with her fellow employees about their working conditions.”219  The General 
Counsel’s office concluded that the Charging Party’s discharge was, in 
essence, a “pre-emptive” strike by the President because of his fear of what 
the Charging Party’s discussions might lead to.220 
5. Complaining About a Coworker’s Promotion 
After the employer promoted an employee to the position of co-
manager, the Charging Party posted a message on Facebook reflecting her 
frustration.221  This led to a Facebook “conversation” among the Charging 
Party and three Facebook coworker friends, which included complaints 
about the promoted employee and mismanagement.222  One of the 
coworkers commented that, “it would be pretty funny if all of the good 
employees actually quit.”223  The Charging Party commented that she had 
not received a raise or a review in three years.224  Of the four workers who 
participated in the Facebook conversation, two, including the Charging 
Party, were fired; the other two were disciplined—all due to the Facebook 
posts.225 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the four 
employees were engaged in protected concerted activity; they had 
discussed their shared concerns about terms and conditions of 
employment.226  While the concerted aspect of their discussions may have 
been preliminary in nature, the General Counsel’s office concluded they 
had been halted by the employer’s pre-emptive discharge and discipline of 
the four employees.227 
6. Stating That You Hate Where You Work 
In February 2011, several employees engaged in a Facebook 
“conversation” discussing issues at work including postings by the 
Charging Party which included comments that she hated “that place” and 
that the Operations Manager was the one “who made it so bad.”228  A few 
 
 219.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 20. 
 220.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 20. 
 221.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 20. 
 222.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21. 
 223.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21. 
 224.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21. 
 225.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21. 
 226.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21 (noting also that prior to 
the Facebook postings, the Charging Party had spoken to two coworkers on separate 
occasions over how the employer had selected the employee for promotion). 
 227.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 22. 
 228.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 23. 
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days later the Charging Party was fired due to her Facebook posts.229  The 
NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the Charging Party’s 
Facebook posts constituted protected concerted activity because (1) 
“employee complaints and criticism about a supervisor’s attitude and 
performance may be protected by the Act,” and (2) the Facebook 
“conversation” was a continuation of earlier group action that included 
employee complaints to management about the Operations Manager.230  In 
this incident, the General Counsel’s office considered whether the 
Charging Party lost protection because the Facebook “conversation” could 
be viewed by nonemployee members of the public, possibly harming the 
employer’s reputation and business.231  It concluded, however, that the 
Charging Party did not lose protection of the Act because, while her 
comments were critical of the Operations Manager, they were not 
defamatory and were “not in any way critical of the Employer’s product or 
business policies.”232 
7. Making Multiple Accusations Against Your Employer 
A hospital disciplined and ultimately terminated a nurse due to his 
numerous online postings and public statements, including:  repeatedly 
asserting the hospital’s conduct had contributed to a fired employee 
shooting two supervisors, killing one and critically wounding the other; 
accusing the hospital of abusing its employees in a letter to the local 
newspaper; posting online that the hospital had been named in an unfair 
labor charge; and sending a local newspaper an online letter to the editor 
critical of the hospital.233  The nurse was reprimanded for the last two 
comments.234  The nurse was suspended after another of his letters to the 
editor was posted on the newspaper’s website and he posted a follow-up 
comment on the newspaper’s online forum, claiming that four employees 
who had “stood up to management . . . were subjected to abuse and 
manipulation.”235  Three months later, the nurse made a presentation to the 
borough assembly, the text of which was posted on the nurse’s Facebook 
page and in the newspaper, charging that “under the leadership of the 
Employer’s CEO, there had been multiple unfair labor practices filed, 
forced policy changes, a murder/suicide, unfair firings, harassment, and 
 
 229.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 23. 
 230.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 23. 
 231.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 25. 
 232.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 25. 
 233.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 26. 
 234.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 26–27. 
 235.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27. 
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workplace bullying.”236  The nurse was then fired for posting the 
presentation.237 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the comments 
and communications relied upon by the hospital in disciplining and firing 
the nurse “were related to and in the context of an on-going labor dispute 
between the employees and their employer.”238  It noted in particular that 
the nurse’s statements were widely followed by fellow employees.239  The 
General Counsel’s office concluded also that the nurse’s comments did not 
lose protection of the Act for being disparaging:  they “were general 
criticisms of the Employer’s treatment of its employees and their working 
conditions and were related to and in the context of ongoing labor disputes.  
Moreover, the criticisms did not disparage the Employer’s product:  its 
provision of healthcare.”240 
V. Facebook Posts Containing Racial Stereotypes and Slurs 
After the Charging Party, an employee at the Detroit Medical Center, 
received a promotion and raise, other employees complained that his 
promotion and raise violated their collective bargaining agreement, and the 
Charging Party ultimately lost his promotion and raise for that reason.241  In 
response, the Charging Party posted derogatory comments about his 
coworkers on his Facebook page that contained racial stereotypes and 
slurs.242  In response to the Facebook comments, the Charging Party’s 
workplace locker was vandalized and he was told to stay at home a few 
days until the workplace atmosphere cooled.243  The Charging Party was 
disciplined and placed on probation for violating the employer’s social 
media policy.244 
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel conceded the Charging 
Party’s Facebook posts could have constituted protected concerted activity 
since they arguably contained “complaints about his union’s performance 
of its representational duties . . . .”245  The General Counsel’s office 
concluded, however, that the posts lost their section 7 protection because 
 
 236.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27. 
 237.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27. 
 238.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27. 
 239.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 28–29. 
 240.  Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 29. 
 241.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ray Kassab, 
Acting Regional Director of Region 7, Detroit Medical Center, No. 07-CA-06682, 2012 WL 
1795803, at *1 (Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem.] available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458084ffc5. 
 242.  Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *1-2. 
 243.  Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *2. 
 244.  Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *2. 
 245.  Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *3. 
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the Charging Party’s use of offensive racial stereotypes was opprobrious 
and caused a serious disruption in the workplace. 
W. Criticizing Coworkers 
Five employees of Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. (“HUB”), a non-
profit corporation which renders social services to its economically 
disadvantaged clients in Buffalo, New York, engaged in a Facebook 
“conversation” in which they expressed their concern over being criticized 
by a particular coworker who was also threatening to complain about their 
job performances to supervisors.246  The target of the criticisms complained 
to HUB’s Executive Director about the Facebook posts and the five 
employees were subsequently fired.247 
In determining the firings were an unlawful violation of the NLRA,248 
the ALJ stated: 
The [five fired employees] were taking a first step towards taking 
group action to defend themselves against the accusations they 
could reasonably believe [their coworker] was going to make to 
management.  By discharging the . . . [employees, HUB] 
prevented them by [sic] taking any further group action vis-à-vis 
[the coworker’s] criticisms.  Moreover, the fact that [HUB] 
lumped the [employees] together in terminating them, establishes 
that [HUB] viewed the five as a group and that their activity was 
concerted.249 
The ALJ continued: 
Just as the protection of Sections 7 and 8 of the Act does not 
depend on whether organizing activity was ongoing, it does not 
depend on whether the employees herein had brought their 
concerns to management before they were fired, or that there is 
no express evidence that they intended to take further action, or 
that they were not attempting to change any of their working 
conditions.250 
In conclusion, “[e]xplicit or implicit criticism by a co-worker of the 
manner in which they are performing their jobs is a subject about which 
employee discussion is protected by Section 7.”251 
 
 246.  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Docket No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at 
4-6 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 09031d4580622877 (pagination based on 
NLRB-source document). 
 247.  Id. at 6. 
 248.  Id. at 7. 
 249.  Id. at 8–9. 
 250.  Id. at 9. 
 251.  Id. at 9. 
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X. Embarrassing Your Employer 
Robert Becker, a salesman with Knauz BMW, was concerned that the 
dealership was going to serve hot dogs from a hot dog cart and bagged 
chips at a promotional event celebrating a redesigned BMW model, and 
posted his concerns on his Facebook page.252  The same day, Becker also 
posted pictures and his own commentary of an incident at a dealership 
across the street, also owned by the same owner as Knauz BMW, in which 
a potential customer’s teenage son evidently drove a Land Rover into a 
pond located on the property.253  Becker was subsequently fired.254 
Besides Becker’s Facebook post concerning the promotional event, 
the dealership’s salespeople had held in-person discussions about the food 
to be served at the event, fearing it would hurt sales and, consequently, 
their commissions.255  This, the ALJ concluded, constituted protected 
concerted activity.256  The posting about the Land Rover incident, however, 
was not protected activity because it “had no connection to any of the 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment.”257  Because it was the 
Land Rover posting which was the primary reason Becker was fired,258 
Becker was not fired in violation of the NLRA.259 
Although the ALJ did not find that Becker was unlawfully fired, he 
did conclude that three provisions of the employer’s Employee Handbook 
restricted employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.260  The ALJ 
paraphrased two of the provisions as “prohibit[ing] employees from 
participating in interviews with, or answering inquiries concerning 
employees from, practically anybody.”261  The ALJ concluded that “[i]f 
employees complied with the dictates of these restrictions, they would not 
be able to discuss their working conditions with union representatives, 
lawyers, or Board agents.”262  A third Employee Handbook provision 
stated, “[n]o one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other 
language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.”263  The 
 
 252.  Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437, at 1–3 (N.L.R.B. 
Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580683b21 (pagination based on 
NLRB-source document). 
 253.  Id. at 4. 
 254.  Id. at 4–5. 
 255.  Id. at 2. 
 256.  Id. at 8. 
 257.  Id. at 9. 
 258.  Id. at 9. 
 259.  Id. at 9. 
 260.  Id.at 10–11. 
 261.  Id. at 9. 
 262.  Id. at 10. 
 263.  Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ALJ concluded employees could reasonably interpret this provision as 
curtailing their section 7 rights.264  Although the dealership had rescinded 
the provisions in question prior to the ALJ hearing, the ALJ concluded 
rescission alone was not sufficient—the dealership did not give assurances 
to employees that in the future it will not interfere with the exercise of their 
section 7 rights.265  The ALJ therefore ordered the dealership to post a 
notice that it would not interfere with employees in the exercise of their 
section 7 rights.266 
Y. Accusing Your Employer of Improperly Withholding Payroll Taxes 
Some of the employees of the Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille 
(“Triple Play”) received an unpleasant surprise when they filed their 2010 
state tax returns—they owed the state still more taxes.267  In February 2011, 
a former Triple Play employee posted a message on her Facebook wall 
about how she owed additional taxes, claiming the owners of Triple Play 
could not “do the tax paperwork correctly!!!”268  Soon three current 
employees and two customers joined the “conversation,” posting negative 
comments about Triple Play and its owners, including a suggestion that one 
of the owners pocketed the unpaid withholding taxes.269  The next day, one 
of the employees who participated in the Facebook conversation—Jillian 
Sanzone—was fired, in part, because her Facebook comment indicated 
disloyalty.270  Two days after the Facebook conversation, another 
employee, Vincent Spinella, was also fired.271  Spinella had not posted a 
comment, but had used a Facebook feature to indicate that he “Liked” one 
part of the conversation.272  The owners fired Spinella because by clicking 
“Like,” Spinella did not have Triple Play’s best interests in mind.273 
The ALJ concluded that Sanzone and Spinella were engaged in 
protected concerted activity when they participated in the Facebook 
 
 264.  Id. at 11.  The ALJ concluded that a fourth provision—“[a] bad attitude creates a 
difficult working environment and prevents the Dealership from providing quality service to 
our customers,” id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) would reasonably be read to 
protect the relationship between the dealership and its customers, rather than to restrict the 
employees’ section 7 rights.  Id. at 11. 
 265.  Id. at 11. 
 266.  Id. at 12, 14. 
 267.  Three D, L.L.C., No. 43-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862, at 3 (N.L.R.B. Div. of 
Judges Jan. 3, 2012), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 
09031d458079eae4 (pagination based on NLRB-source document). 
 268.  Id. at 3. 
 269.  Id. at 3–4. 
 270.  Id. at 4. 
 271.  Id. at 5. 
 272.  Id. at 4. 
 273.  Id. at 5. 
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conversation:  “It is beyond question that issues related to wages, including 
the tax treatment of earnings, are directly related to the employment 
relationship . . . .”274  The Facebook conversation “was part of a sequence 
of events, including other, face-to-face employee conversations, all 
concerned with employees’ complaints regarding [Triple Play’s] tax 
treatment of their earnings.”275  The ALJ also concluded that Spinella’s 
selecting the “Like” option “was sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the 
level of concerted activity.”276 
Z. Complaining About Late Paychecks 
In August 2010, a number of employees at Bay Sys Technologies, 
LLC began complaining in Facebook posts about delays in receiving their 
paychecks, which were republished by a local newspaper.277  One of the 
employees participating in the conversations was subsequently fired.278  
The NLRB concluded the discharged employee, as well as the other 
employees, were clearly engaged in protected concerted activity—a 
conclusion made easier by the fact that the employer did not defend against 
the charge.279 
III. CHANGES WROUGHT BY SOCIAL MEDIA 
Three fundamental issues arise from the incidents discussed above.  
First, only twelve of the incidents were determined to involve concerted 
activity, and only ten were protected by the NLRA.280  The advent of 
employee social media postings has not created any new bright-line test for 
what constitutes protected concerted activity.  Second, the NLRB is taking 
a hard look at employers’ social media policies.  In particular, an outright 
ban on disparaging or criticizing the employer risks being considered by 
the NLRB a violation of section 7.  Third, the NLRB is considering the 
extent to which an employer’s access to an employee’s Facebook postings 
constitutes unlawful surveillance.  These three considerations are discussed 
next. 
 
 274.  Id. at 8. 
 275.  Id. at 8. 
 276.  Id. at 8–9. 
 277.  Bay Sys Techs., LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 1 (2011). 
 278.  Id. at 2. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  See supra Parts II.B., C., E., U.1., 4., 5., 6., and 7., V., W., Y., and Z.  Recall that 
Kathleen Reichle’s Facebook posts complaining about a coworker were not protected 
because she was not a statutory employee, see supra note 70, and Robert Becker’s Facebook 
post complaining about his employer was not protected since it was not the reason he was 
fired, see supra notes 252-59. 
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A. Protected Concerted Activity Revisited 
If anything, the above analysis of the thirty-two incidents—coupled 
with the fact that nearly sixty percent of the social media charges included 
in the FOIA request have been closed without further action281—establishes 
that merely talking about work online does not automatically constitute 
protected concerted activity.  Although the Board has developed a 
definition of concerted activity, it is subject to interpretation. 
As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court applied section 7’s 
concerted activity language in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., holding 
that employees who walked off the job due to extreme cold in their work 
area engaged in protected concerted activity.282  In reversing the Board’s 
original decision that the employees had engaged in protected concerted 
activity,283 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that since the workers 
summarily left the workplace in violation of workplace rules without 
giving the employer an opportunity to address their complaint, their action 
was not protected by section 7.284  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding 
that employees do not “necessarily lose their right to engage in concerted 
activities under § 7 merely because they do not present a specific demand 
upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable.”285 
But what must be the context of the discussion between or among 
employees?  Shortly after the Supreme Court’s Washington Aluminum Co. 
decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that in order to be 
protected under section 7, a worker’s conversation “must appear at the very 
least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or 
preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the 
interest of the employees.”286  The courts and the Board further considered 
 
 281.  The number of social media-related charges identified through the FOIA request 
are relatively miniscule compared to total charges filed.  For example, approximately 23,500 
charges were filed with the NLRB in 2010.  N.L.R.B., Charges and Complaints, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/charges-and-complaints (last visited May 26, 2012).  However, an 
argument can be made that rather than being ignorant and fearful of section 7 rights, see 
Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their 
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 458 (1995) 
(“Most likely, the vast majority of non-union employees remain ignorant of this right, or are 
too fearful to exercise it.”) (footnote omitted), nonunion employees are ignorant of the scope 
of their section 7 rights. 
 282.  370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). 
 283.  Wash. Aluminum Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1960), aff’d. 370 U.S. 9 (1962). 
 284.  NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 291 F.2d 869, 877 (4th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he purpose 
of the [A]ct was not to guarantee to the employees the right to do as they please under any 
given set of circumstances and in total disregard of the obligations of their employment.”). 
 285.  Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14. 
 286.  Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964). 
Activity which consists of mere talk must, in order to be protected, be 
talk looking toward group action.  If its only purpose is to advise an 
FINAL DRAFT 
2012] FACEBOOK MEETS THE NLRB 995 
 
the contours of concerted activities in a series of decisions involving a 
truck driver who was discharged after his safety complaints and his refusal 
to drive an unsafe truck after reporting its condition to the Tennessee 
Public Service Commission.287  The ALJ had determined the employer 
violated section 7 by discharging the employee, following an interpretation 
of concerted activity developed in Alleluia Cushion Co.:  despite not 
involving other workers, an individual employee’s safety complaints were 
of vital interest to coworkers and therefore would be supported by those 
coworkers.288  In Meyers I, the Board reversed its earlier approach to 
concerted activity reflected in Alleluia Cushion Co., noting that the 
wording of section 7 “demonstrates that the statute envisions ‘concerted’ 
action in terms of collective activity:  the formation of or assistance to a 
group, or action as a representative on behalf of a group.”289  It also 
enunciated a definition of concerted activity:  “to find an employee’s 
activity to be ‘concerted,’ we shall require that it be engaged in with or on 
the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the 
employee himself.”290 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Meyers I, rejecting both 
Alleluia Cushion Co., as well as the Board’s definition of concerted activity 
 
individual as to what he could or should do without involving fellow 
workers or union representation to protect or improve his own status or 
working position, it is an individual, not a concerted, activity, and, if it 
looks forward to no action at all, it is more than likely to be mere 
“griping.” 
Id. 
 287.  Meyers Indus., Inc. [Meyers I], 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984). 
 288.  Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975) (“[W]here an employee 
speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupational safety designed 
for the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that fellow employees 
disavow such representation, we will find an implied consent thereto and deem such activity 
to be concerted.”).  This is known as “constructive” concerted activity.  See, e.g., Terry A. 
Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the 
Court and the Board, 59 IND. L.J. 583, 584 (1984) (stating that the NLRB has blurred the 
distinction between individual and concerted action, and even purely individual action that 
ostensibly benefits the group can be considered concerted action under the constructive 
concerted activity doctrine).  Gorman and Finkin argue that by using the term “concerted 
activity,” Congress never intended to exclude individual action:   
In terms of statutory construction, there are not two abstract and 
distinguishable categories of action—individual action for self-interest 
and collective action for mutual interest—one which Congress chose not 
to protect and the other which Congress chose to protect, but rather a 
continuum of individual activity—of individuals choosing to speak and 
act on their own behalf, singly and in small and large groups.   
Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of 
“Concert” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 344–45 (1981). 
 289.  Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 493–94. 
 290.  Id. at 497. 
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enunciated in Meyers I.291  Specifically, the circuit court believed the Board 
incorrectly assumed it was required to narrowly interpret the section 7 
statutory language.292  In contrast, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court had previously stated: 
Although one could interpret the phrase, “to engage in concerted 
activities,” to refer to a situation in which two or more employees 
are working together at the same time and the same place toward 
a common goal, the language of section 7 does not confine itself 
to such a narrow meaning.293 
Instead, regarding the nature of the relationship that must exist 
between the action of the individual employee and the actions of the group 
in order for section 7 to apply, it is for the Board “to resolve in light of its 
expertise in labor relations, as long as its judgment [is] reasonable.”294 
On remand, the Board, while acknowledging its wide latitude in 
interpreting section 7,295 concluded its definition enunciated in Meyers I 
was reasonable.296  In addition the Board stated, “[t]here is nothing in the 
Meyers I definition that states that conduct engaged in by a single 
employee at one point in time can never constitute concerted activity within 
the meaning of Section 7.”297  For example, the Board explained that the 
definition “encompasses those circumstances where individual employees 
seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as 
individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of 
management.”298 
Eleven of the thirty-two incidents discussed in this article appear fairly 
clear-cut.  In Reuters, the employee was reprimanded for tweeting a 
comment regarding union negotiations.299  The latest NLRB Acting General 
Counsel’s Memo recounts five incidents in which the General Counsel’s 
 
 291.  Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 292.  Id. at 952. 
 293.  NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984); Prill, 755 F.2d at 951. 
 294.  Prill, 755 F.2d at 951 (citing City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. at 829). 
 295.  Meyers, Indus., Inc. [Meyers II], 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 883 (1986) (“At the outset, we 
reaffirm our recognition that the Board has a wide latitude in interpreting Section 7 of the 
Act, as the Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions.”). 
 296.  Id. at 885 (“[T]he Meyers I definition strikes a reasonable balance.  It is not so 
broad as to create redundancy in Section 7, but expansive enough to include individual 
activity that is connected to collective activity, which lies at the core of Section 7.”). 
 297.  Id.  While Meyers I may have required more explicit authorization of 
representation of a group, Meyers II implies that express authorization is not a necessary 
prerequisite.  B. Glenn George, Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and the NLRA, 56 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 509, 517 n.55 (1988).  But see Sharpe, supra note 5, at 208 (asserting 
that after Meyers II the NLRB does not currently recognize as concerted, for example, “a 
lone employee reporting company safety violations to a state agency”). 
 298.  Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887. 
 299.  See supra, Part II.C. (providing details of the events that transpired in Reuters). 
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office concluded employees were engaged in protected concerted 
activities.300  In Hispanics United of Buffalo, the employees were fired as a 
result of their online discussions, which were in reaction to a coworker’s 
criticisms of the manner in which the HUB employees performed their 
jobs.301  The fired employees were taking the first steps in group action 
arising from accusations against them that they believed were going to be 
presented to management, action they were prevented from completing 
because they were fired.302  In Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille, two 
employees were fired for “disloyalty” after participating in a Facebook 
conversation about improper tax withholdings from their paycheck—
considered beyond question by the ALJ as concerted activity.303  Similarly 
the Board also determined that employees discussing late paychecks were 
clearly engaged in protected concerted activity.304  Kathleen Reichle and 
her fellow nurses were engaged in concerted activity when they discussed 
another nurse’s continual absenteeism.305  Finally, Robert Becker’s posting 
constituted concerted activity because it summarized earlier discussions he 
had with fellow salespeople regarding the possibility of lower 
commissions.306 
Dawnmarie Souza’s Facebook postings were more similar to Robert 
Becker’s than the employees at HUB.  Fellow employees who responded to 
Souza’s postings mainly offered only commiseration; there was no 
discussion of group action.  However, the NLRB’s Office of the General 
Counsel concluded her Facebook postings were protected concerted 
activity because they were related to an earlier workplace incident with a 
 
 300.  See supra, Parts U.1., 4., 5., 6., and 7. (citing a variety examples, ranging from 
assertions of management incompetence to statements that the employees hated where they 
work, in which an employee’s posts on social media sites were considered concerted action 
because co-workers responded to the posts or engaged the employee in online 
“conversation”). 
 301.  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at 8 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov 
/link/document.aspx/09031d4580622877 (pagination based on NLRB-source document). 
 302.  Id. at 8–9. 
 303.  Three D, L.L.C., No. 43-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 
3, 2012), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079eae4. 
 304.  See supra Part II.Z. (discussing a Bay Sys Technologies employee who was 
wrongly fired for complaining about late paychecks on Facebook). 
 305.  See supra Part II.E. (providing extensive discussion of Reichle’s case and the 
position of the Board’s General Counsel).  However, Reichle’s concerted activity was not 
protected because she was not a statutory employee.  See supra note 70 (noting that Reichle 
was a supervisor and thus not an “employee” under the meaning of the Act). 
 306.  See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text.  However, Becker’s concerted 
activity was not protected since it was not the reason he was fired.  See supra notes 257-259.  
Recall also that in one incident, an employee’s Facebook posts were arguably protected 
under section 7, but that protection was lost due to racial stereotypes and slurs contained in 
the posts, which caused significant workplace disruption.  See supra Part II.V. 
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supervisor.  The General Counsel’s office evidently considered Souza to 
have been fired for an outburst related to an earlier section 7 activity.307  
Yet, when Brian Morris, the Wal-Mart employee, made similar Facebook 
postings following a dispute with his supervisor in response to which he 
received only supportive comments from coworkers, the General Counsel’s 
office concluded he was not engaged in protected concerted activity.308  
The only difference between Souza’s activity and Morris’s appears to be 
that Morris’s postings were not in response to his section 7 rights having 
been denied by his supervisor. 
Ultimately, as the majority of the incidents discussed in this Article 
demonstrate, merely airing a complaint or griping about an incident at work 
is not going to be protected.  These incidents clearly enumerate the 
elements currently required to establish protected concerted activity:  (1) 
online postings must relate to terms and conditions of employment;309 (2) 
there must be evidence of concert—i.e., there must be discussions among 
employees of the posts or coworker responses to the posts; (3) there must 
be evidence the employee was seeking to induce or prepare for group 
action; and (4) the posts must reflect an outgrowth of employees’ collective 
concerns.310  The last three elements can be rephrased as requiring the 
employee to express concerns other than his own, with evidence of an 
intention to instigate group action or bring a group concern to 
management.311 
 
 307.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9, n.16  (“It is well established that the protest 
of supervisory actions is protected conduct under Section 7.”) (citing Datwyler Rubber & 
Plastics, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 669 (2007); Groves Truck & Trailer, 281 N.L.R.B. 1194 
(1986)).  The Office of the General Counsel had concluded that Souza’s supervisor had 
violated the NLRA by denying her union representation when she was ordered to write an 
incident report.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating the same as well as 
noting supervisor’s improper threat based on Souza’s invocation of her union rights). 
 308.  Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *2. 
 309.  The Board can be quite literal in this regard.  See, e.g., Orchard Park Health Care 
Ctr., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 644 (2004) (deciding that a complaint by two nurses to the state 
department of health alleging that the nursing home was excessively hot—while 
concerted—was not protected because the complaint was made on behalf of patient welfare 
rather than arising from working conditions; specifically, the nurses’ ability to deliver 
patient care); Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 302 (2004) (deciding that one female 
worker who sought the assistance of another in her sexual harassment charge against a male 
supervisor was not engaged in concerted activity because she was looking out only for 
herself).  These cases contribute to former Board Chairwoman Wilma Liebman’s concern 
that in recent years, the Board “has chosen a very confined view of ‘concerted activity’ for 
the purpose of ‘mutual aid or protection,’ as protected by section 7 of the Act.”  Wilma B. 
Liebman, Essay, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National 
Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 583 (2007). 
 310.  See, e.g., Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *2 (discussing 
a case where the Charging Party failed to meet the criteria for concerted action). 
 311.  See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *3 (stating individual activities 
that are the logical outgrowth of the concerns expressed by the employees collectively are 
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As demonstrated above, particularly exemplified by Dawnmarie 
Souza,312 employees can be quite disrespectful in their postings about work 
and supervisors.313  As previously discussed, an employee who is engaged 
in protected concerted activity can, through “opprobrious” conduct, lose the 
protection of the Act.314  Four factors are considered to determine whether 
the employee will lose protection:  “(1) the place of the discussion;315 (2) 
the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s 
outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an 
employer’s unfair labor practice.”316  The Board has determined “that 
offensive, vulgar, defamatory or opprobrious remarks uttered during the 
course of protected activities will not remove activities from the Act’s 
 
considered concerted). 
 312.  See AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23 (describing how Souza had referred to her 
supervisor using a code for psychiatric patients and called him a “dick” and a “scumbag”).   
 313.  See also supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing how one Wal-Mart 
employee began his Facebook post with “Wuck Falmart!”); Three D, LLC, No. 43-CA-
12915, 2012 WL 76862, at 11 n.6 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079eae4 (pagination based on NLRB-
source document) (discussing an employee’s use of the word “asshole” to describe one of 
the employer’s owners, and participating in a Facebook conversation in which the owner 
had been referred to as a “shady little man”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 314.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the standard used to 
determine whether an employee’s conduct makes it beyond the protection of the Act).  Or, 
as articulated by William Corbett, “The Board and the courts have developed a common law 
exception to section 7 protection where the employee engages in bad faith conduct.” 
Corbett, supra note 9, at 283 (citing illegal conduct as one of the exceptions). 
 315.  The key to this first factor is whether the discussion disrupts the workplace.  See 
Three D, LLC, 2012 WL 76862, at 10.  In Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille, customers had 
participated in the Facebook conversation at issue, raising the question of whether the 
presence of the customers harmed the business.  Id.  However, “the presence of customers 
during brief episodes of impulsive behavior in the midst of otherwise protected activity is 
insufficient to remove the activity from the ambit of Section 7’s protection where there is no 
evidence of disruption to the customers.”  Id. (citing LaGuardia Associates, LLP, d/b/a 
Crowne Plaza LaGuardia, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 95, at 4 (2011); Goya Foods of Fla., 347 
N.L.R.B. 1118, 1134 (2006), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Goya Foods of Fla., 525 F.3d 
1117 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 316.  Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).  The four factors are generally 
referred to as the “Atlantic Steel factors.”  In Souza’s case, her comments:  took place 
outside the workplace during non-work hours, addressed supervisory actions, contained no 
verbal or physical threats, and were provoked by unlawful behavior by her supervisor.  See 
supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Reef Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830, 
837–39 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an employee’s sending a sarcastic letter and t-shirt to 
his manager ridiculing the education level of plant employees was protected activity 
because:  statements on the tee-shirt and in the letter were not “fraught with malice, 
obscene, violent, extreme, or wholly unjustified[;]” the activity was not highly egregious, or 
ultimately highly harmful to the employer’s business; the activity related to an on-going 
labor dispute and adequately related to the employee’s employment relationship; the 
employee essentially intended to convey his dismay with how the employer treated its 
employees; and because his activity related to terms and conditions of employment). 
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protection unless they are so flagrant, violent, or extreme as to render the 
individual unfit for further service.”317  But these exceptions may not be as 
extreme as indicated.318 
For example, in the fall of 2008, Nick Aguirre, a newly-hired car 
salesman, repeatedly questioned his managers and the employer’s owner 
about the size of his commissions, the lack of minimum-wage draws 
against commissions, and general working conditions.319  The managers’ 
usual response was that if Aguirre did not like the situation he should 
quit.320  Aguirre’s complaints ultimately led to a meeting among Aguirre, 
the employer’s owner, and its two managers, during which Aguirre lost his 
temper, berated one of the managers with a string of expletives, stood up, 
pushed his chair aside, and told the owner that if he fired him, the owner 
would regret it; at which point the owner then fired Aguirre.321  The ALJ 
found that the employer: 
had violated section 8(a)(1) several times by inviting Aguirre to 
quit in response to his protected protests of working conditions. 
As to the discharge, however, the ALJ applied Atlantic Steel and 
concluded that, although Aguirre was engaged in protected 
activity during the . . . meeting, his obscene remarks and personal 
attacks on [the owner] cost him the Act’s protection.322 
The Board, however, concluded Aguirre’s conduct was not so severe as to 
cause him to lose statutory protection.323 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals walked through the Atlantic Steel 
factors to determine whether Aguirre’s conduct removed him from NLRA 
protection.  The place of the discussion favored continued protection 
because it was in a manager’s office, away from the workplace and it did 
 
 317.  Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309, 315 (1975) (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 782 (1974); Bob Henry Dodge Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 78 (1973); Ben Pekin 
Corp., 181 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1970); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 
(1966)); see also Harris Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 733, 738–39 (1984) (holding that while an 
employee’s letter to management was “harsh, insubordinate, and attacked the personal 
characters of members of . . . management” and was “written in a boorish, ill-bred, and 
hostile tone[,]” it did not maliciously interfere with the exercise of the employer’s rights, the 
employee did not engage in a clearly deliberate or malicious falsehood, and the employee 
did not use language which was worse than “unkind and mannerless”) (footnote omitted). 
 318.  See Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 749 (2001) (deciding self-made 
newsletters employee distributed within the workplace which insinuated another employee 
was homosexual and used an obscene play on words to refer to the employer’s bonus 
program were “so offensive as to render the otherwise protected newsletters unprotected” 
under section 7). 
 319.  Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 289–90 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Id. at 290–91. 
 322.  Id. at 291. 
 323.  Id. 
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not affect employee discipline.324  The subject matter of the discussion also 
favored continued protection because it concerned working conditions and 
Aguirre’s outburst was contemporaneous to the nature of the discussion.325  
Regarding the nature of the outburst, however, the court noted the Board’s 
own precedents, which recognize that an employee’s offensive and 
personally denigrating remarks alone can result in loss of protection.326  
The court therefore remanded the matter to the Board “to allow it to 
properly consider whether the nature of Aguirre’s outburst caused him to 
forfeit his protection.”327  Finally, the court agreed that Aguirre’s outburst 
was provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practices.328  In sum, there is 
the possibility that regardless of the other three Allied Steel factors, a 
vitriolic, obscenity-laden outburst could alone deprive an employee of 
section 7 protection.329  In contrast, however, opprobrious comments in the 
form of racial stereotypes and slurs that cause significant workplace 
disruption can also deprive an employee of section 7 protection.330 
Ultimately, the Board and the courts must balance the interests of the 
employer against the section 7 rights of the employee.331  As with Souza, 
 
 324.  Id. at 292 (rejecting also the employer’s contention that protection should be lost 
because Aguirre requested the meeting with the intent of humiliating the owner in front of 
his two managers). 
 325.  Id. at 293. 
 326.  Id. at 293–94 (citing Care Initiatives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996); Stanford 
N.Y. L.L.C., 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 559 (2005); Daimler Chrysler Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 1324, 
1328–29 (2005)). 
 327.  Id. at 294–95 (citing Trus Joist MacMillan, 341 N.L.R.B. 369, 371–72 (2004) 
(concluding that the third Atlantic Steel factor alone may carry enough weight to forfeit the 
Act’s protection)). 
 328.  Id. at 295 (concluding Aguirre’s outburst was contemporaneous with both the 
owner’s censure of Aguirre’s protected activities and his unfair labor practice of suggesting 
that Aguirre could work elsewhere if he did not like the company’s policies). 
 329.  But see Datwyler Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 669, 670 n.5 (2007) 
(agreeing in the finding that an employee’s outburst was not so opprobrious as to lose the 
protection of the Act, since even “assuming arguendo the third factor (the nature of the 
outburst) weighs against protection, it is outweighed by the other three factors”). 
 330.  See supra Part II.V. 
 331.  See Corbett, supra note 9, at 283.  Also, in balancing the interests of the employer 
and the rights of the employee, protected activity can lose its protection if it extends beyond 
a reasonable time. See, e.g., Quietflex Mfg. Co., 344 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1058–59 (2005) 
(holding “that employees are entitled to persist in their protest for a reasonable period of 
time, after which the employer is entitled to assert its rights as to its entire premises[;]” and 
finding that the twelve-hour duration of the employees’ action was unreasonable, 
particularly in view of the employer’s attempts to respond to their concerns); see generally 
Sam Heldman & Hilary E. Ball, Quietflex Manufacturing and the Unpredictable Case-by-
Case Balancing of Section 7 Rights: “Liberty Finds no Refuge in a Jurisprudence of 
Doubt,” 22 LAB. LAW. 97 (2006) (critiquing the “Quietflex rule” as not changing the law but 
raising doubt as to what the law is); Amy J. Zdravecky, “If I Only ‘Had a Brain’ . . . I Could 
Figure Out the Contours of Concerted Activity Versus Other Competing Rights”: Quietflex 
Manufacturing and Its Ten-Factor Balancing Act for Determining How Long a Protected 
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though, that balance will almost always fall in favor of the employee with 
the acknowledgement that “time outside working hours, whether before or 
after work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee’s time to use 
as he wishes without unreasonable restraint . . . .”332  However, outside 
conduct does not automatically retain section 7 protection that may 
otherwise be present.  For example, posting on Facebook, regarding recent 
earthquakes in the area, the employee’s desire for the employer’s building 
to collapse while certain members of management were inside of the 
building will generally exempt an employee from section 7 protection.333 
In addition to illegal activity, deliberate lies will usually take an 
employee outside of protection.334  As discussed earlier, the NLRB’s Office 
of the General Counsel concluded an employee’s Facebook post suggesting 
her employer was engaged in fraud was not protected once the employee 
refused to remove the post after being informed of convincing evidence 
that fraudulent conduct had not occurred.335 
B. Social Media Policies 
As discussed previously, social media policies which may reasonably 
be interpreted to chill protected concerted activity will be considered 
unlawful.336  While an outright ban on section 7 activities would clearly 
violate section 8(a)(1),337 it is not always clear which types of prohibited 
 
Concerted Work Stoppage Can Continue on the Employer’s Premises, 22 LAB. LAW. 69 
(2006) (discussing the ten circumstances that will determine at what point a protected 
concerted work stoppage becomes unreasonable so as to lose its protection under the 
NLRA). 
 332.  Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945) (quoting Peyton 
Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)); see Morris, supra note 10, at 1708. 
 333.  See Dismissal of Charges Letter from Ronald Hooks, Reg’l Dir., NLRB, No. 26-
CA-24000 (June 30, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx 
/09031d4580520e25 (discussing dismissal of charges); see also supra Part II.V. (describing 
loss of section 7 protection due to posting comments containing racial stereotypes and slurs 
that caused significant workplace disruption). 
 334.  See, e.g., NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 291 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that “[e]rroneous assertions lose their protected status only when they are 
published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were 
true or false.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard 
Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966) (applying specifically to employee protected 
activity under section 7)).  
 335.  See supra Part II.Q.; see also, United Cable Tel. Corp., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 3, 9 
(1998) (Koven, Arb.) (determining that an employee who posted a letter on a union bulletin 
board which called the employer’s vice president a liar did not engage in protected 
concerted activity because his motive was to “revivify and exacerbate the antagonism that 
had previously been the controlling feature of the relationship” between the employer and 
the union prior to a “détente”).  
 336.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 337.  See, e.g., Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (explaining that “a rule is 
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communications may or may not chill section 7 activities.  For example, 
banning disparagement alone does not necessarily restrict section 7 
activity.338  As noted by the General Counsel’s office, “cases in which rules 
could not reasonably be construed to cover protected activity involved 
situations in which the rules clarified their scope by including examples of 
clearly illegal or unprotected conduct and/or there was no evidence that the 
rules were applied against protected activity.”339  For example, in Fiesta 
Hotel Corp., a rule forbidding employees from engaging in “any type of 
conduct, which is or has the effect of being injurious, offensive, 
threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfering with fellow Team 
Members or patrons”340 was found not to be unlawful because the 
prohibited conduct was not “inherently entwined with Section 7 activity[,]” 
nor was its “terms so amorphous that reasonable employees would be 
incapable of grasping the expectation that they comport themselves with 
general notions of civility and decorum in the workplace.”341  Similarly, in 
an Advice Memorandum, the Office of the General Counsel concluded that 
Sears Holdings’ social media policy, which included a prohibition against 
“[d]isparagement of company’s or competitors’ products, services, 
executive leadership, employees, strategy, and business prospects[,]”342 was 
not unlawful because the policy itself “covers a list of proscribed activities, 
 
unlawful if it explicitly restricts Section 7 activities”). 
 338.  See, e.g., Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (noting that a rule can 
implicitly restrict section 7 activities if one of three conditions is met:  “(1) employees 
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was 
promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the 
exercise of Section 7 rights”) (citing Lutheran Heritage Vill.-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 
647 (2004)). 
 339.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3; see also Acting General Counsel’s 
Adv. Mem., supra note 190, at 17 (concluding that an employer’s social media policy that 
required employees to confine their social networking to matters unrelated to the company 
was lawful because the overall context, including specific examples listed by the employer, 
would reasonably be construed by employees to address only communications that could 
implicate securities regulations). 
 340.  Fiesta Hotel Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1367 (2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 341.  Id. at 1368.  But see Hills & Dales General Hosp., No. 07-CA-53556, 2012 WL 
542765 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Feb. 17, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580854c07 (concluding that Values and 
Standards of Behavior policies which prohibited negative comments about fellow 
employees, including managers, and engaging in or listening to negativity or gossip were 
overly broad as they could reasonable be construed as prohibiting protected activity; while a 
policy that requested employees to represent the employer in the community in a positive 
and professional manner was not considered unlawful). 
 342.  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Martin O. 
Osthus, Regional Director of Region 18, Sears Holdings (Roebucks), No. 18-CA-19081, 
2009 WL 5593880, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Sears Adv. Mem.], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45802d802f. 
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the vast majority of which are clearly not protected by Section 7.”343  As 
such, taken as a whole, as in Tradesmen International, the Policy contains 
sufficient examples and explanation of purpose for a reasonable employee 
to understand that it prohibits the online sharing of confidential intellectual 
property or egregiously inappropriate language and not section 7 protected 
complaints about the Employer or working conditions.344  In contrast, 
AMR’s Blogging and Internet Posting policy, which stated that 
“[e]mployees are prohibited from making disparaging, discriminatory or 
defamatory comments when discussing the Company or the employee’s 
superiors, co-workers and/or competitors,”345 was considered unlawful 
because it contained “no limiting language to inform employees that it [did] 
not apply to Section 7 activity.”346 
When the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel or an ALJ has found 
potentially protected concerted activity, they are much more inclined to 
address social media policies, versus policies in place when no concerted 
activity is involved.  In Flagler Hospital, where the Charging Party 
evidently engaged in protected concerted activity but for her status as a 
supervisor,347 the General Counsel’s office recommended the NLRB 
Regional Office issue a complaint arising from the Hospital’s social media 
policy.348  In Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., in which Robert Becker engaged in 
concerted activity but was not dismissed because of that activity,349 the ALJ 
found portions of the employer’s social media policy to be unlawful and 
ordered remedial action—even though the employer had rescinded those 
policies prior to the ALJ hearing.350  In the incident involving the employee 
 
 343.  Sears Adv. Mem., supra note 342, at *3. 
 344.  Sears Adv. Mem., supra note 342, at *3.  But see William R. Corbett, The 
Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and 
Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 47 (2006) (reviewing Board 
decisions applying workplace rules of decorum and civility, concluding that the Board is 
narrowing employees’ section 7 rights, particularly for nonunion employees). 
 345.  AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 5. 
 346.  AMR Adv. Mem. supra note 23, at 14.  But see Three D, LLC, No. 43-CA-12915, 
2012 WL 76862, at 20 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079eae4 (pagination based on NLRB-
source document) (concluding that an employer’s Internet/Blogging Policy—which stated 
that “employees may be ‘subject to disciplinary action’ for ‘engaging in inappropriate 
discussions about the company, management, and/or co-workers’”—was not unlawful 
because it was directed toward maintaining the company’s reputation with respect to the 
general public) (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 460–61 (2002); Ark Las Vegas 
Rest. Corp., 335 N.L.R.B. 1284, 1291–92 (2001); Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 N.L.R.B. 
287, 288–89 (1999)). 
 347.  See supra note 70. 
 348.  Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3. 
 349.  See supra Part II.X. 
 350.  See supra notes 260–266 and accompanying text. 
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who used an obscenity as his job title in a LinkedIn profile,351 the NLRB’s 
Office of the General Counsel addressed the employer’s electronic 
Communications Usage policy, which: 
forbids material that is “obscene[,] defamatory, harassing or 
abusive” to any person or entity associated with the company. 
We note that the inclusion of the word “harassing” arguably 
could be construed to preclude protected online content, since 
such a broad term would commonly apply to protected criticism 
of the employer’s labor policies, and the Board has consistently 
stated that discipline imposed under an unlawfully overbroad rule 
violates the Act.352 
However, since the LinkedIn “joke” was not considered concerted, there 
was no violation of the NLRA when the employee was fired for violating 
the policy.353 
The Board has recently formally articulated its stance on overbroad 
rules: 
[D]iscipline imposed pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule 
violates the Act in those situations in which an employee violated 
the rule by (1) engaging in protected conduct or (2) engaging in 
conduct that otherwise implicates the concerns underlying 
Section 7 of the Act. Nevertheless, an employer will avoid 
liability for discipline imposed pursuant to an overbroad rule if it 
can establish that the employee’s conduct actually interfered with 
the employee’s own work or that of other employees or otherwise 
actually interfered with the employer’s operations, and that the 
interference, rather than the violation of the rule, was the reason 
for the discipline.354 
In other words, if an employee is disciplined for engaging in protected 
concerted activity through a social media policy containing one or more 
overbroad rules, the Board will take action against the employer based on 
its policy.355  If an employee is disciplined for engaging in unprotected 
concerted activity through a social media policy containing one or more 
overbroad rules, the Board will still take action against the employer based 
on its policy in order to minimize the chilling effect of the policy.356  
Finally, if an employee is disciplined for engaging in activity outside the 
gambit of section 7—fundamentally unconcerted activity—through a social 
 
 351.  See supra Part II.N. 
 352.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1 n.1. 
 353.  Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1. 
 354.  Cont’l Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2011 WL 3510489, at *6 (Aug. 11, 2011) 
(“It is the employer’s burden . . . to establish that the employee’s interference with 
production or operations was the actual reason for the discipline.”). 
 355.  See, e.g., supra Part II.B. 
 356.  See, e.g., supra Part II.X.; see also notes 76–77 and accompanying text.. 
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media policy containing one or more overbroad rules, the Board will not 
take action against the employer based on its policy as long as the employer 
can establish the employee’s conduct interfered with the workplace and the 
employee was not disciplined solely because of the overbroad policy.357 
In the Board’s opinion, this approach minimizes the likelihood of a 
chilling effect on employees’ section 7 rights by properly acknowledging 
the employer’s legitimate interests while simultaneously discouraging post-
hoc rationalization of disciplinary decisions.358  Once again, the Board is 
“balancing . . . employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ legitimate 
interest in establishing work rules for the purpose maintaining discipline 
and production.”359 
One final aspect of communications policies is that the Board will 
evidently not consider informal policies unlawful.  For example, Brian 
Pedersen, the Arizona Daily Star reporter, was verbally instructed to not air 
his grievances or comment about the employer-newspaper in any public 
forum,360 and ultimately told not to tweet about anything work-related.361  
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded “those statements 
did not constitute orally-promulgated, overbroad ‘rules[;]’ . . . the 
statements were made solely to the Charging Party in the context of 
discipline, and in response to specific inappropriate conduct, and were not 
communicated to any other employees or proclaimed as new ‘rules.’”362 
 
 357.  See, e.g., supra Parts II.K. and N.; see generally supra Part II.D. 
 358.  See Cont’l Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at *6 (concluding that the rule formulated in 
the holding “reflects a deliberate balancing of employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ 
legitimate interest in establishing work rules for the purpose [of] maintaining discipline and 
production”). 
 359.  Id.; see supra note 331 and accompanying text (noting that the court may balance 
the interests of the employer and the rights of the employee).  But see Corbett, supra note 
344, at 47 (concluding that recent Board decisions have “elevate[d] employers’ desires to 
avoid liability under other laws and to ensure civility and decorum in the workplace and 
subordinate[d] the rights of workers to engage in protected concerted activity for mutual aid 
or protection”). 
 360.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 361.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *5. 
 362.  Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *7; see also Salon/Spa at Boro, Inc., No. 
9-CA-45349, 2010 WL 5099879, at 24 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Oct. 18, 2010), available 
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45803b97a9 (finding that an older 
employer’s verbal warnings to younger employees not to post comments critical of the 
business on Facebook to be less about the work environment and more about “life in 
general”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (pagination based on NLRB-source document).  
It is clear to me that [the employer’s] overall purpose in warning her 
employees to be careful in their use of social networking media was 
didactic, not coercive.  Thus, her references to the potential negative 
effects of the exercise of poor judgment when using the sites did not 
represent a threat of reprisal from management but rather a warning that 
poorly chosen statements or photographs could have a negative impact 
on a young person’s reputation with resulting impact on her career. 
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C. Unlawful Surveillance 
As noted in a few of the incidents described in Part II., employees 
have accused their employers of unlawful surveillance.363  In particular, 
does a supervisor’s knowledge of the contents of an employee’s Facebook 
postings create an impression of surveillance?  As a general matter, absent 
a legitimate justification, employers are prohibited from engaging in 
surveillance, as it tends to chill employees’ freedom to exercise their rights 
under the NLRA.364  This includes surveillance of protected activity taking 
place during non-work time.365  Although discussing union activities, the 
Board has ruled that “the test for determining whether an employer has 
created an impression of surveillance is whether the employee would 
reasonably assume from the statement that their union activities had been 
placed under surveillance.”366  The Board explained: 
The idea behind finding “an impression of surveillance” as a 
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act is that employees should 
be free to participate in union organizing campaigns without the 
fear that members of management are peering over their 
shoulders, taking note of who is involved in union activities, and 
in what particular ways.367 
 
Id. On May 30, 2012, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel released a report in which his 
office reviewed seven employer social media policies, finding six of them to be unlawful. 
Memorandum from Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB to All Regional Directors, 
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Report of the Acting General Counsel 
Concerning Social Media Cases (May 30, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd. This latest report provides 
further guidance from the office of the General Counsel on what is and is not permissible in 
social media policies. 
 363.  See supra Parts II.A., J., and S. (discussing examples of the application the 
elements of unlawful surveillance in nonunion settings). 
 364.  See Calif. Acrylic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that employers violate section 8(a)(1) if employers engage in activities that chill 
their employees’ freedom to exercise section 7 rights); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 
302 F.3d 868, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that employer surveillance often causes 
employees to refrain from exercising their rights under federal labor law due to a fear of 
reprisal). 
 365.  Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Employees, and Labor 
Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1068 (2006). 
 366.  Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257, 257 (1993). 
 367.  Id.  In an unreported decision, the Board determined there was no unlawful 
surveillance when a supervisor viewed a picture of employee union organizers on a union 
website, considering it analogous to “merely observing open union activity.”  Magna Int’l, 
Inc., No. 7-CA-43093(1), 2001 WL 1603861 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 9, 2001).  However, when the 
supervisor mentioned to one of the employees that he had seen her in the picture, “he was 
conveying the impression that he was keeping track of her union activities and thus was 
creating the impression of surveillance” in violation of section 8(a)(1).  Id. (citing Fred’k 
Wallace & Sons, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 914, 915 (2000) (deciding that “unlawful impression of 
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Stated another way, an employer can create an unlawful impression of 
surveillance when it “reveals specific information about protected activity 
that is not generally known and does not reveal its source.”368  However, 
Facebook itself can add an extra dimension to this analysis.  For example, 
in Public Service Credit Union, the employer’s HR Vice President, who 
obtained a copy of the Charging Party’s Facebook posts, did not reveal 
which employee was his source.369  However, the NLRB’s Office of the 
General Counsel concluded the employer did not engage in unlawful 
surveillance because the Charging Party had restricted access to his posts to 
only his Facebook “friends;” therefore, “he could not have reasonably 
concluded that the Employer was directly monitoring his Facebook 
page[,]” and could only conclude “that the Employer learned of his 
Facebook activity from his Facebook friends.”370 
There is no impression of surveillance when the employer informs 
employees it has obtained the content of online postings and conversations 
from coworkers or customers,371 or when the employee has “invited” a 
supervisor to view Facebook postings by “friending” the supervisor.372  
Depending on one’s Facebook privacy settings, however, friends of friends 
may be able to see one’s postings—so a supervisor may be able to see an 
employee’s postings even if the employee did not “friend” the supervisor, 
if the supervisor has friended a friend of the employee.  Arguably, the 
knowledge that a supervisor is Facebook friends with some employees 
 
surveillance” was not created by supervisors merely observing union activities, but by 
supervisors making clear to an employee they were taking particular note of them); 
Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. at 257) (noting that an employer may create an 
impression of surveillance, which constitutes an unlawful interference with section 7 
rights)).  As revealed in the earlier discussion of incidents, the elements for unlawful 
surveillance have been applied in nonunion settings.  See supra Parts II.A., J., and S. 
(discussing examples of the application of the elements of unlawful surveillance in 
nonunion settings). 
 368.  Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *5. 
 369.  Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *4. 
 370.  Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *4. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). See also MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *6 (concluding that 
accepting information from one employee regarding the online activity of another employee 
does not constitute monitoring); Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1276 
(2005), enforced sub nom. Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc. v. NLRB, 181 F. App’x 85 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (determining that the employer did not engage in unlawful surveillance by not 
revealing who had sent copies of postings on a secure website because “a reasonable 
employee would assume that [the employer] lawfully learned of [his] message exactly the 
way [the employer] did—through public dissemination by another website subscriber”). 
 371.  See MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *3 (“[N]o impression of surveillance is 
created where the employer explains that it obtained the information from another 
employees, particularly in the absence of evidence that the employer solicited the 
information.”). 
 372.  See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting that because the employee 
“friended” his supervisor, the supervisor could not be said to have engaged in surveillance). 
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could chill work-related discussions on Facebook.  Like Facebook, Twitter 
tweets will be public unless the user expressly selects to “protect” her 
tweets.373  If a Twitter user keeps her tweets public, she will not know who 
is “following” her—in other words, receiving a copy of her tweets—unless 
she actively manages her account by identifying followers and potentially 
blocking them from receiving her tweets.  Without diligence, a Twitter user 
could therefore be sending tweets to management without even knowing 
it—just as a Facebook user’s posts may be available to a manager who is a 
friend of a friend.  These are issues raised by newer technology that have 
yet to be directly addressed by the Board.374 
What is unknown is whether the Board would consider a manager’s 
access to Facebook posts through friend-of-a-friend status to be equivalent 
to the Charging Party’s Facebook friend giving copies of the posts to the 
manager.  Though, arguably, friend-of-a-friend status implies monitoring, 
whereas monitoring is generally considered absent when the employer has 
received copies of Facebook posts by an employee’s Facebook friend.  
Similarly, will a tweeting employee have an obligation to monitor 
followers to weed out management?  Again, electing to follow an 
employee’s tweets implies monitoring.  Friend-of-a-friend status or 
following tweets implies the employer is not merely observing employee 
activities, but making particular note of them.375 
Ultimately, is the best advice to employees to limit Facebook posts to 
friends only and to not make tweets public—fundamentally crippling the 
social attributes that have made Facebook and Twitter so popular and so 
dear to their hundreds of millions of users?  In the alternative, if employees 
choose to not heavily restrict access to their posts and tweets, are they then 
allowing their protected activities to be potentially chilled?376  The balance 
between these two options has yet to be resolved. 
 
 373.  About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER.COM, https://support.twitter.com/ 
articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-tweets (last visited May 26, 2012). 
 374.  See generally, Jeffery M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the 
NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (2008) (arguing that the Board’s failure to adapt to 
evolving communications technologies, including the Internet, could result in the NLRA 
losing its relevancy). 
 375.  See generally, supra note 367 (noting that unlawful surveillance may occur in a 
nonunion setting, which would include Facebook or twitter surveillance). 
 376.  See generally, Jeffery M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of 
Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091 
(2011) (addressing the potential of communications technologies, which could facilitate and 
enhance concerted activities, to actually thwart such activities, from the perspective of 
workplace communications in light of the Board’s decision in The Guard Publ’g Co., 351 
N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 
2009)). 
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CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
As the above discussion implies, the fact that employees are using 
Facebook and other social media tools to discuss work does not alter the 
basic analysis of what does and does not constitute protected concerted 
activity.  If the majority of social media-related NLRB charges filed by 
employees against their employers are any indication, most work-related 
online postings are merely gripes.  They are complaints about fellow 
workers or managers that do not involve a call to action; they do not 
express a collective concern that has been or will soon be brought to the 
attention of management.  In the alternative, if employee online posts do 
constitute concerted activity, they will not lose their protection merely 
because they are rude or disrespectful.  They will not lose protection unless 
they are extremely vitriolic, threaten harm, or otherwise disrupt the 
workplace. 
In the meantime, employers are learning that overly broad social 
media bans can run afoul of the NLRA.  While employers can risk 
maintaining overly broad policies as long as they respect employee section 
7 rights, the Board will take action if it appears an employee was dismissed 
through such a policy after engaging in concerted activity, protected or not.  
So far, the main focus has been on policies that ban disparagement of the 
employer’s business or its managers, as often complaining about working 
conditions can result in disparaging remarks.  As such, the NLRB has 
clearly signaled that without specificity—making clear that concerted 
activities are not included—an employer’s policy against disparagement 
may be unlawful.  The NLRB has also made clear that a “savings clause”—
an overly broad prohibition ending with a disclaimer it will not be applied 
against concerted activities—will not save the employer.377 
Finally, the unique sharing aspects of social media—particularly 
Facebook—can raise surveillance issues that have yet to be directly 
addressed by the Board.  It is clear that no impression of unlawful 
surveillance is created when the employer is provided copies of an 
employee’s Facebook posts or tweets by a friend or follower of the 
employee.  And, at least initially, to “Friend” a supervisor on Facebook is 
tantamount to inviting the supervisor to view the employee’s posts.  But 
how voluntary would such a “Friend” request be?  Would it be reasonable 
for the employee to be concerned there could be negative repercussions, 
however indirect, if the employee refused a supervisor’s friend request or 
later “unfriended” the supervisor?378  Similarly, without taking affirmative 
 
 377.  See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompany text, and note 209. 
 378.  See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 WL 6085437, 
at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008) (involving a restaurant waitress who provided access 
information to management for a secure MySpace account not because she was “explicitly 
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steps to restrict access to Facebook posts or Twitter tweets, there is always 
the possibility of a friend-of-a-friend or following supervisor lurking in 
cyberspace.  Clearly, supervisors who, through their own efforts, gain 
access to posts and tweets to potentially track employee communications 
raise the specter of chilling concerted activities through unlawful 
surveillance. 
 
 
 
threatened with any adverse employment action,” but because she was afraid she would get 
in trouble with management if she did not). 
